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THE NATURE AND BASIS OF CHRISTIAN CERTAINTY.

by

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Nature and Basis of Christian Certainty.

Introduction: The Practical Bearing of Our Theme.

Though it must be essentially theoretical in its nature the following essay has a primarily practical purpose. If we read the history of the past aright, time was when the work of the Kingdom of Christ was being pushed with greater vigor and intensity than at present. We would not disparage the achievements attempted and completed today; for they are mighty and inspired by mighty conviction and mighty faith. Yet we believe that such conviction and such faith are not as widespread as they ought to be; and though often they are accompanied by a more intelligent and humane spirit than in the past, they still seem to lack the force and impetus that made great Christian results possible in days gone by. But whatever view we take of the comparative merits of past and present in their contributions to Christian progress, we must believe that the world-wide programme of Christ will never have successful issue unless effort and result be greatly multiplied.

As we review the lives of those, living or dead, who by the help of God have performed signal services for the Kingdom of Christ, one dominating impression holds us: whether correct or incorrect in all detailed matters of faith, they possessed convictions so profound, a sense of the certainty of the truth of their beliefs so deep and potent that these pressed for expression not only in overwhelming utterance in the words of their mouths, but also in great deeds, constant, heroic, self-sacrificial. Up to the best measure of their ability and with the use of instruments of knowledge accessible to them, they pushed the search for truth; and, up to the best measure of their strength, they labored to make that truth, reached by so much devotion, incarnate in human society; so that truth, which is righteousness in thought, might realize itself in deed. To be sure, though the verdict of their posterity has vindicated their fundamental conceptions, some of the conclusions of the fathers have proved erroneous, or if not, then unessential. Yet in general, unless he have some special interest at stake, no one charges them with the vice of insincerity, a lack of earnestness in seeking

truth, or a want of heroism in attempting to embody it in the laws, the institutions, the life of man. We could have wished for greater tolerance in matters unessential, greater charity, larger humility, an increased measure of love for men; but we do not question the sincerity, the earnestness, the burning conviction by which they were impelled to so great mental labor and to tasks of such great heroism.

Our own time has suffered from a lack of conviction on fundamental things in general and often an absence of the profound certainties in matters of Christian faith, which aforetime stirred our fathers. Philosophic scepticism has disturbed easily achieved dogmatisms; literary and historical criticism has overturned traditional attitudes toward the Holy Scriptures; and practical infidelity, ever active and agressive, continues its onslaughts on human character and life. Materialism, agnosticism, pantheism, in manifold forms and many devious ways, have assisted to break down the bulwarks of the ordinary man's faith, which too often timid and shrinking enough in the face of practical unbelief, is reduced to quiet, and many times, inexplicable terror, by what it conceives to be fearful phantoms, all the more portentous because vague and ill-defined. The practical result has been in many quarters a dismal falling off in evangelistic effort and a consequently profound loss of vitality in the life of many of our local churches. That which after all has done most for the establishment of Christian conviction---the possession and extension of the deep-lying experiences of the Christian life---has thus been dealt a series of deadening blows; and that deep respect, both on the part of believers and unbelievers, for the realities of Christian experience and the objective validity of its beliefs has in many places disappeared. Cheap devices for giving the church a hearing and continued adaptations of Gospel truth in accord with the specious dictates of a superficial mob-psychology have, in many cases, caused the utter loss of genuine faith on the part of the members of the church in the sovereign power of the Almighty Father.

As is often the case with a practical situation, even though it has most harmful moral consequences this condition has not been without its exponents in theory. Many

of these recoiling from UnChristian illiberality and inhuman intolerance in the past have made a plea for breadth and tolerance creating the impression that matters of belief are items of indifference. In many quarters, as a consequence, there has arisen a supercilious attitude toward matters of "dogma" or "doctrine" as the profoundest conclusions of human thought and life are contemptuously dubbed, that has made for superficial thinking unreflectively justified in the name of modern progress. It is not long, however, before the close relation between thought and life obtaining everywhere, makes itself felt in the sphere of religion, and laxity of life follows hard on superficiality of thought. Some of the self-constituted champions of tolerance wax so warm in their defence of so-called liberality that they soon reveal themselves so hotly intolerant of conclusions other than their own or manifest a breadth so broad and thin that they are positively flat. The religious faith they advocate is in its defense of breadth so narrow that only a limited number of ultra advocates of license can assimilate it, or in its fundamental conclusions so sublimated as to be essentially without practical power in the daily life of men. Whatever be the breadth of the larger end of the wedge of truth, one's faith ought to be narrow enough to have a cutting edge at the other.

From long experience realizing the difficulties in the way of the achievement of a generally satisfactory Christian Certainty, many defenders of the Christian system of truth, ostensibly in the interest of religion itself, have scouted the possibility of attaining certainty. The possession of absolute certainty, they say, would compel the most antagonistically inclined to embrace Christianity; and this is contrary to one of its fundamental presuppositions, that the Christian life is essentially a freely chosen life. So argues Henry Churchill King, one of the most intelligent exponents of Christian living. In his work, "The Seeming Unreality of the Spiritual Life" he remarks, p149, "And if there is to be no forcing of God and the spiritual world upon a man, this would seem to mean further, that we can expect no absolutely incontrovertible evidences, no overpowering signs,--certianly not before the ethical choice. A choice will be left, some room for out own attitude of will to have its

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effect. It is this principle which Pascal seems to have in mind when he says, (Thoughts and letters p.327,355) 'God wished to render himself perfectly recognizable to those who seek him with their whole heart and hidden from those who shun him with their whole heart.' 'Religion is a thing so great that it is just that those that would not take the pains to seek it if it is obscure ,should be deprived of it. What do they complain of then, if it is such that they could find it by seeking it.' And he intimates how this obscurity becomes a moral test:'If you care but little to know the truth, here (in a suggested difficulty) is enough to leave you in repose. But if you desire with all your heart to know the truth, it is not enough, examine minutely." So also with approval President King quotes Lotze: (Microscosmus Vol.II p.54) "It would not be advantageous for moral development if the binding truth of all particular moral commands, and the indissoluble connection between them, were presented to individual minds with the theoretical certainty of an arithmetical proof, and if it were not left for every soul to fight its way through the battle of life, by living, believing action and effort, to this clearness of comprehensive moral intuition." We discern in this very explanation, however, a further attempt to establish the Christian Certainty, and to reduce the amount of uncertainty. Room must be left to be sure, for free choice in the search for truth and the achievement of the highest moral and spiritual life. But the possession of absolute certainty exerts no absolutely coercive power on the human will. He who supposes so has lived a life more in reflection on nebulous theories, than in the stress and strain of a career interested not merely in an individual life in accord with the Christian ideal, but concerned also to order the defective state of human society by the social programme of the master of men. The question, it seems to us,may be legitimately raised whether the moral challenge of loyal response to the Christian system of truth, accepted as absolutely certain, be not all the test necessary to impose on man's moral and spiritual nature. Certainty assumed as reached, there yet remains self control of body, mind,and spirit, self-repression or self-assertion in accord with Christian demands, study of methods and labor to incorporate them in human life; alertness in meeting intellectual opposition; fearlessness

in facing concrete antagonism; patience and stamina in the burden and heat of the day; and increase in that mighty love which is but a barren mockery the moment the existence and nature of its divine Object in under any real question. Are we vigorously to argue that the greater the ignorance and uncertainty involved in Christian decision the deeper the virtue? the wider the knowledge and the more assured the attitude, the more vitiated the moral life? Are we to conclude that the almost unlimited knowledge of Christ and what seems to us His intuitive understanding of ultimate reality reflects in any sense on the moral test he underwent? Were every member of the Christian Church equipped with an absolute certainty, a herculean task great enough to stagger all but the highest courage would still be before it.

We are free to admit that the sense of certainty does give an impulsion to practical activity. In the realms where such sense is most largely developed human operations center; where it is least there interest shrinks. It is therefore of greatest advantage to the Christian kingdom to develope the certainty of its citizens. Whatever restrictions on this inference have been made in theory, even theorists have followed it in practice. They have laid down limitations that, these being understood, the certainty might appear the more unlimited. Are we to have a mighty expansion of Christian interest and activity, then we must have a mighty deepening of Christian Certainty as its basis.

It is because I feel the truth of these conclusions profoundly that I write on this theme and not another: a fact that in itself is an illuminating comment upon them. It is because Christian experience is partly an effort toward certainty as a basis for practical activity, as practical activity in turn reacts upon certainty, that a theoretical venture has such deep practical consequences. The kind of sacrifice for which Christ calls would be irrational in proportion as it is founded on uncertainty; and rational only as it is based on assurance.

What then is Christian Certainty and on what is it based.[2] Fairly to answer this question we must ask concerning the nature and basis of certainty in general and of its relation to Christian Certainty.

I. The Nature and Basis of Certainty in General.

A. Subjective and Objective Elements in Certainty.

The most cursory examination of the experience of men reveals the presence of a sense of certainty with regard to elements of that experience. Whether there be legitimate basis for that conviction is not now a matter immediately under consideration. That an objective order corresponds to sensation and concept; that consistency and harmony between judgments is a fair test of their validity; that the senses, the reason, the feelings, and the moral convictions, when in their normal estate and properly guarded, do not deceive and betray us; that we can properly act in practical matters, though with due degree of caution for fear of the intrusion of unexpected or unknown elements in experience;-- these are the firm conclusions of the largest part of mankind, antedating any analysis of experience or attempt to give rational justification to them. Our first task, therefore, will be to examine the nature of this certainty in experience, to analyze its nature, examine its validity, and formulate any conclusions that may be valuable in our study of the nature and basis of Christian certainty.

We use the phrase 'in experience' advisedly, since all the data and criteria must necessarily be a product of that experience whose nature and content are the basis of our life. When, moreover, we use the term experience in its fundamental sense we use it as synonymous with the flow of personal consciousness. Consciousness is presented as a quality when "somebody 'is conscious' of something." Thus it seems to imply (1) a subject that is conscious, and an object of which the subject is conscious; and (2) a relation between the subject and object which is in some sort a cognitive one. Further, the subject is either pleasantly or unpleasantly affected (in however faint a degree) by its contact with the object; and this feeling gives rise to some sort of reaction of motor expression, while both feeling and motor reaction will vary more or less with every variation on the cognitive side of consciousness. Hence it is held that consciousness (1) implies a fundamental duality of subject and object, and (2) consists of three constituents-viz. cognition, feeling, will or conation. These three constituents are regarded as being

present in some form in every state of consciousness, though, of course they may be very variously developed and combined". (Nelson's Encylopaedia, Vol. III. p. 309).

This leads us to follow Ward in his distinction between two conceptions of life contained in his masterly work, "Naturalism and Agnosticism." "Experience", he says, (Vol. II. p. 111) "is rather an organic unity that we always regard as self-maintained. In a word it is life, βίος -life as it is for the living individual, not life or βιός, the interaction of organism and environment, with which the so-called biologist is exclusively concerned, and where both organism and environment are objects for a distinct observer." Further ambiguities in the term life, however, render its use liable to misconstruction. It is because of these that we object to the use made of it by F. J. McConnell in his work on "Religious Certainty". Now he uses the term as meaning physical life; now as relating to material achievement; again as bearing on intellectual attainment or moral attitudes; and finally to the highest spiritual experiences of the individual and of the race. Oftentimes "that which makes for life" in the one sense, does not make for life in the other. Apart from the consideration that "that which makes for life" is a piece of evidence not a criterion; the term, while it may serve a useful purpose for popular exposition, is hopelessly vague and uncert in for purposes of consistent and careful use.

Even the term experience is vague and uncertain. One who wrote with insight into the difficulties of its use says, "Experience is one of the most ambiguous words in the vocabulary of philosophy. When the term is used in what may be called a historical sense, as when we speak of 'learning from experience', it refers to the past process, by which our present knowledge was acquired, and emphasizes especially the direct contact with facts, which gives the element of reality in knowledge, and makes it more than abstract notions, communicated to us by others. When this usage of the term is extended to embrace the present and the future, we get the conception of experience as the continuous process by which the knowledge of any individual, especially as depending on his own direct contact with reality, grows and widens. And when finally, we substitute the race for the individual, we have the widest conception of a collective experience embracing the whole life of the race. Other meanings in which the term is used may be

regarded as more or less legitimate abstractions from this comprehensive and concrete meaning. (Par) "The distinction sometimes drawn between what is directly perceived and what is inferred, suggests the reduction of primary and immediate experience to the barest minimum of sensation and feeling while all the remainder of experience is explained as manufactured out of these primary sense data by processes of association and inference. And the further suggestion is apt to present itself that the primary sensations constitute the genuine reality of experience, while the superstructure is the less authentic work of the mind. It is when experience is broken up in this abstract way that the controversy arises between a spurious empiricism and the rationalism which is its counterpart. For actual experience, whether it be wide or narrow, is always concrete knowledge, and never mere data. And the work of the mind by which knowledge grows is never a work of arbitrary invention, but rather of discovery, so that the results are equally real with what is directly given. And the distinction between the two cannot be drawn."

It is because the substance of these paragraphs must be emphasized later that we insert them here at length. The sensational psychology has laid stress on the preponderating value of the evidence of the senses in reaching truth. The validity of such an attitude we will also discuss later. Meanwhile we take the term experience to mean the flow of human self-consciousness both in relatively active and passive states. Primarily this means the experience of the individual; but also the experience of the race$, as by the processes of knowledge we come into possession of what is of value here also.

We speak definitely, moreover, of the consciousness of the individual because the fundamental data of experience evidence the existence of the self or ego. Personal consciousness is equivalent to self-consciousness. What the consciuosness of an animal may be we cannot with certainty decide. We conclude that it lacks elements essential to human self-consciousness and self-direction. That the self is an entity, the indivisible subject of its states, is the primary deliverance of self-consciousness which neither a sensationalistic scepticism or an abstract rationalism has been able to vitiate. T.H.

Green in his "Introduction to Hume" has most painstakingly and exhaustively demonstrated the failure of the sensationalist psychology. F. H. Bradley's attempt in his "Appearance and Reality" to reveal the idea of the self as inconsistent has proved futile. His self-complacent, but merely apparent success, is due to his failure to distinguish between the self and its contents. The term "contents", indeed, is perhaps in itself a source of error. Its use inclines to his conclusion, that, if anything, the soul is the sum of its contents; and since these can never be gathered up; he calls the knowledge of the soul "inconsistent". But could we exhaust the whole content of the soul there would still be a residuum. Far truer to our experience, and therefore, far more desirable in use, is emphasis upon the activities of the soul. Even in its so-called "passive states"--which as receptive are still active, the soul reveals itself to itself as existing in a self-poised state. In its more active functions it is more true to its experience to speak of it, as do the modern psychologists, led by Schiller, Dewey, James, and Ward, as thinking, or seeking, or reaching out after reality, than as the container of ideas. The latter notion has given rise to many far-reaching difficulties, which having been manufactured by the undiscerning, now prove a sourse of wonderment. In the most passive state of self-consciousness, which, to use Bradley's term, is an "inner core of feeling", or "coenesthesia", before the soul can be described as reflectively possessing content, when it has not definitely shaped its ideas, it is conscious of its self-poised, if not self-created and wholly self-maintained, existence. This is the primary datum of experience to which we must appeal in attempting to explain all things, instead of trying to explain it by an appeal to them. To adopt the latter course is to attempt to explain the explanation, to account for experience, which must be used to account for everything. To transcend experience is an impossibility. Whatever may be the possible experiences of other beings than ourselves, their existence, as well as that of their owners, is not even affirmable, save as the affirmation finds some rational foundation in our own experiences.

But self-consciousness, itself, primary to the nature of experience, reveals the existence of subject and object, which in this unique experience are one. In the mystery of self-consciousness, not to be explained by experience, we find a duality in unity. In

- the words of Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, 2:118) We start then with this duality of subject and object in the unity of experience. That a subject without objects, or that objects without a subject could be, is, indeed, as we are often told, unknowable; for in truth the knowledge of either apart is a contradiction." Before the question logically arises of the existence of objects or even of the existence of its ideas, in the primary experience of self-consciousness, the self as subject knows itself as the object of its contemplation, and knowing itself as object, it knows itself, also, as subject of this contemplative activity. We use the term "logically" because, looking back over our experience we are quite certain that "chronologically" the matter has not thus come to consciousness. Logically, then, the self next knows, as objects, its "ideas", or perhaps more accurately and unambiguously, its activities. Chronologically, it has long been conscious of the existence of objects, including its body--to which it is so intimately conjoined--as apart from itself. Through its body and sensations, defined as elemental conscious processes connected with bodily processes in definite bodily organs, knowledge of these objects has been mediated, and they have helped bring it to self-consciousness. And just as self-consciousness has subjective and objective aspects, so do sensations. Conceived of in relation to their subject they are mental processes; conceived of in relation to their sources, apart from the mind, they are objective processes. On this point Ward says emphatically, (Naturalism and Agnosticism, 2:118) "Nevertheless I contend that the sensory and color changes or processes entering into each conscious experience are objective to the subject of that experience; inasmuch as they can be attended to or apprehended, liked or disliked. (2:116) Much claim (that sensations are objective) is often disallowed on the ground that sensations pertain really to feeling and not to cognition; or again on the ground that they are the matter of experience simply; whereas the objects of cognition must have form.------ Sensations have form; in other words they have ineliminable characteristics, quality, intensity, extensity; as people say again nowadays they have a 'what' as well as a 'that'. Again they are not isolated; but as I have already urged they are changes in that-- for want of a better word-- I have been fain to call a presentational continuum. The so-called pure sensation of certain psychologists is a pure abstraction; as much so as the mere point of the physicist, but without perhaps the warrant on the score of utility." Here again we have a

primary relationship behind which we cannot go. The question, then, may be asked, as Ward asks it, and answered, as Ward answers it, (2:117). "If these primary presentations are essentially objective, not subjective, modifications, how is the relation of the subject to such objects to be conceived? The subject has several necessary relations to all actual presentations, and to these we must refer presently. But as regards the bare fact of presentation there is nothing to be said; it is that relation of subject to object and object to subject in virtue of which they are severally subject and object. As the absolutely ultimate relation within experience we can say either that it is inexplicable, or that it needs no explanation, or we may entertain the notion of an absolute (of whatever kind that may be) in which the unity of experience outlasts the duality."

When the primary relationship of subject and object is regarded in this way, no disparagement falls upon one that does not fall upon the other. But unreflective usage and custom has laid a stigma upon the subjective, which for reasons not the most cogent, it has not laid upon the objective. Objectivity has generally been regarded as of itself bringing validity; subjectivity as something to be examined with suspicion. To be sure we know the irregularities and uncertainties of the subjective so much more intimately, and are so much interested in the establishment of the regularities and uniformities of the objective, that seldom do we concentrate our thought on objective irregularities. These, however, are as great and numerous as the other, and if the subjective is to be viewed with suspicion, in like manner must be the objective. Indeed, just as the objective must be viewed as subjectively conditioned; so must the subjective be thought of as having its objective aspects, and as objective, possessing all the validity that goes with objectivity. Thought of singly and introspectively as the subject of its mental states, we speak of the mind and its testimony to its nature as 'merely subjective;' but other minds thought of as objects, and subject to great regularities and uniformities, are as truly objects as are material things; and there appears no essential reason why mental processes and experiences and their testimony to the nature of the ultimate reality should not be thought of as having as great objective validity as the movements of

the stars or the interaction of the molecules of matter. Both are the outcome of the same ultimate force, and therefore, if they represent, and do not belie, its character, both are indications of its nature. It is only on this basis that Psychology can be raised to the dignity of a science; and on this basis only also, that History, Aesthetics, and Religion can be looked upon as bearing evidence valid for our conclusions regarding life and its meaning.

B. Certainty Regarding the Testimony of the Senses.

We say this as we begin to consider the nature of certainty in general and the standards by which we shall judge its validity. It is generally considered that the testimony of the senses must be looked upon as primary and fundamental. "Seeing is believing." In the mind of the mass of mankind it is surely our sensations we must trust most of all for our guidance in the affairs of practical life; and generally speaking no question is raised of the correspondence of our sensations with outer realities which the sensations apparently represent. It may be ligitimately asked, however, why the testimony of the senses should be looked upon as possessing a greater validity than the testimony afforded by the reason or the feelings or the moral convictions. Does the mere unquestioning consensus of opinion in favor of the evidence afforded by the senses necessarily validate their testimony? On this point Arthur James Balfour in his notable work, "The Foundations of Belief" speaks with authoritative insight (p.250) "We are now in a position to answer the question put a few pages back. What, I then asked, is the import from our present point of view, of the universality and inevitableness, which unquestionably attach to certain judgments about the world of phenomena, and to these judgments alone. The answer must be that these peculiarities have no import. They exist but they are irrelevant. Faith or assurance, which if not in excess of reason, is at least independent of it, seems to be a necessity in every great department of knowledge which touches on action; and what great department is there which does not? The analysis of our sense experience teaches us that we require it in our ordinary dealings with the natural world. The most cursory examination into the springs of moral action shows that it is an indispensable supplement to ethical speculation. Theologions are for the most part agreed that without it religion

is but the ineffectual profession of a barren creed. The comparative value however, of these faiths is not to be measured either by their intensity or the degree of their diffusion. It is true that all men, whatever their speculative opinions, enjoy a practical assurance with regard to what they see and touch. It is also true that few men have an assurance equally strong about matters of which their senses tell them nothing immediately; and that many men have on such subjects no assurance at all. But as this is precisely what we should expect if, in the progress of evolution, the need for other faiths had arisen under conditions very different from those which produced our innate and long descended confidence in sense perception, how can we regard it as a distinction in favor of the latter? We can scarcely recognize universality and necessity as badges of preeminence, at the same moment that we recognize them as marks of the elementary and primitive character of the beliefs to which they give their all-powerful, but none the less irrational sanction. The time has passed for believing that the further we go back towards the 'state of nature' the nearer we get to virtue and truth."

We produce this quotation merely to make clear that our deep-lying conviction is not a matter of individual peculiarity: but that the profoundest minds echo the conclusion, so strange to sense bound and unreflective thinking, that sense perception may have no greater validity than thought, feeling, or moral conviction. We dissent, however, from the conclusion that the testimony of the senses has merely "irrational sanction." That this is Balfour's conclusion we may believe from what he says, p.252, "rational necessity does not, so far as I can see carry us at the best beyond a system of mere 'solipsism!"

The question now arises, "What do we mean by rational sanction with regard to the testimony of the senses?" What are the standards by which we shall conclude that our sense perceptions are true or false as they seem to speak of realities without us? These very questions imply our certainty of their objective validity; and it may be that if we discover some satisfactory criterion relating to the testimony of the senses that it may be used also to apply to data coming from other parts of our nature.

Yet before attempting an answer to this question let us note that some of the great

supporters of Christian certainty assume without question the validity of sense perception, and so miss the search for that standard of truth that in its application brings final satisfaction. So it is with F. H. R. Frank in his great work, "System of the Christian Certainty." He concludes (p.57) that "Certainty as a Condition of the subject does not arise without the presupposition of an object of which it assures itself." (p.58) "For the Christian by virtue of his faith, by virtue of all that which makes him a Christian- the objective reality in the first place of the spiritual world in which he lives and with this at the same time also of the physical world, is decided; and the Christian consciousness will therein always remain in harmony with the ordinary natural consciousness. In connection with which then to be sure, the nearer defining of the manner of this objectivity remains reserved. And in addition to this the other consideration has to be taken into account, that the explanation must yet always so take place, as though the world of material things assumed by the realistic hypothesis, really existed."

We do not object to this conclusion: to conclude otherwise would be preposterous; and to the unthinking, superficial sense-bound mind, merely to raise the question involves us in abject idiocy. We merely ask on what basis, with what "rational sanction", if any, we can hold this conclusion. Why not embrace "solipsism," and be done with it. The answer is that such a course would not be "rational;" it would not prove "consistent" in the sense of the term, we shall define at greater length later. Let a man with solipsistic notions start out the day's life, and he will soon have a practical demonstration in a thousand ways of the untruth of solipsism. The testimony of his senses and his reason, the constant interplay of his activities, his appetites and their satisfaction, his manual labor with things as materials and instruments, his intercourse with others would all be preposterously "inconsistent" on solipsistic grounds. Analysis of the nature of this inconsistency makes it clear that between ideas which have objective correspondence, and those that do not there is a vast difference. Ideas which, as he knows them, have no correspondence to things he may handle as such in experience: he is never compelled to face them as if they represented corresponding realities. But when the ideas appear to

represent realities without, it is necessary to deal with the ideas not merely as subjective possessions, but with the things corresponding as if they were realities. To treat differences as if they were similarities is to be as deeply inconsistent as anything can be; as a consequence he concludes that the differences being real involves the existence of external objects. In consistency thus pragmatically defined, of which we shall treat at greater length later, we find the rational sanction, and the only rational sanction, for belief in the existence of objective realities.

Before we go further we must point out that the adoption of consistency as a standard thus interpreted, proceeds on the basis that this is the most fundamental criterion of our rational life. We adopt consistency as a standard because in the nature of the case, we can find no other. But why should we suppose that it is a valid test? Only by making appeal again to the same test can we find adequate answer: it would be inconsistent to suppose otherwise. But the application of the test proceeds on the basis that this is a consistent world. To dissent from this conclusion we can do no more than again make appeal to the test of consistency. When the matter is discussed in this logical way, everyone assents without debate. Yet we must point out that just here where no more seems at stake than the proper formulation of logical criteria there may be implicit all the answers to our manifold question. Logical criteria imply faith in logic. Consistency as a test implies a deep conviction that this is a consistent world. In the lives of many of the great thinkers, in so great contrast to the cold, hard, barren attitude of the logic-chopper, there has existed a deep moral faith, amounting to a passion, in the innermost trustworthiness of the universe. In the fusion of a great personality, intellect, feeling and will have launched out in the great philosophic quest, thus helping formal logic to survive in as little interest as it now holds among the academically inclined. We have here in germ all the difference between certitude and scepticism, between optimism and pessimism, possibly between Christianity and infidelity. Belief in consistency and application of it as a test arises from a deliberate choice without which any rationality is forthwith impossible: complacent acquiesence in inconsistency means the abandonment of the search for truth; the one stands for the hope of ultimate mental conquest; the

other signifies a despair at the very root of life that nothing but a total change can cure.

Instead, therefore, of speaking of faith, as is often done, as something added to, superinduced upon, or transcending reason, or as something contrary to or antagonizing reason, faith must be pictured as a presupposition of reason, as a prerequisite to all thinking. If faith, therefore, be found to lie at the basis of the testimony of the senses and, as has been intimated, at the basis of the testimony of thought, then it will not be thought a matter for derogation, if it be found at the foundations of Christian certainty.

C. Certainty Regarding the Testimony of Thought.

In our discussion of the testimony of the senses we have already passed over to the testimony of thought; for the testimony of the senses is nothing apart from thought. We do not gain knowledge through the senses alone;"it is only when the mind wakes up to the meaning of sensations, and is able to put them together and interpret them that it gains any knowledge." Sensations, to be sure, have their objective aspects; but they are also subjectively conditioned; and apart from thought are nothing. To attempt to establish therefore a wide disjunction between thought and sense is to fly in the face of experience. In experience we find the two conjoined in such a unity, that we must speak not of a dualism but of a duality in unity. For purposes of abstract thought it may prove profitable to separate them, but to treat them as essentially different and incompatible is to overlook the actual unity in which they coexist and to put off explanation of their nature farther than ever. Instead of asking what they are apart from each other it lends to greater insight to inquire on what basis there can be such a duality.

The consideration of this question, however we postpone for the moment, as for purposes of clearness we continue to examine the nature and basis of the testimony afforded by the different parts of our nature. This of course is by abstraction; they are all conjoined in an operant unity, their functions inseparably interlocking. Judgement, the fundamental activity of the mind, is founded on the testimony of the senses. As I sit writing,

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my mind arroused by a rapid succession of explosions, reacts in that essential activity expressive of the very nature of thought, and concludes, "That is an automobile." Examining this mental process we notice that thought thus represents some work that is done, something put together and a conclusion drawn. Propositions are nothing but words embodying concepts that are the result of judgments previously made. The language used is merely a symbol, serving as a permanent record of the judgment or the concept, itself a mental construction due to the processes of judgment through which we have gone. The inference is merely a complex of judgment exhibiting the grounds on which it rests. It is a series of judgments resting on previous judgments. "It may be urged, however, that not every judgment can grow out of previous judgments in this way. For if we go back far enough we must reach some judgment that is absolutely first, and which presupposes some antecedent judgment. This is like the paradox regarding the origin of life. If all judgments are derived from antecedent judgment, how was it possible for the first one to arise? It will perhaps be sufficient answer to deny the existence of the paradox. Consciousness must be regarded as having from the first the form of a judgment. No matter how far one goes back in the history of consciousness, one will always find, so long as consciousness is present at all, some reaction, however feeble, upon the content, and something like knowledge resulting. Even the consciousness of the newly-born infant reacts or vaguely judges in this way. These primitive judgments are of course very weak and confused, but they serve as starting points in the process of intellectual development. Growth in knowledge is simply the process by means of which these vague and inarticulate judgments are developed and transformed into a complete and more coherent experience." (Creighton: An Introductory Logic. p.272)

When now we inquire, "What is the standard by which we can be certain of the validity of a judgment, the response is, "Consistency." In sofar as judgments harmonize with that system of more or less completed thought we call knowledge, they are true; and in sofar as they fail to harmonize we call them false. Apparent disharmony leads to a reexamination of their nature; a new contact with the realities they are supposed to represent; and finally new processes of inference reaching out to other primary judgment. If

we cannot work the new judgment into agreement with our system of judgments to which we grant the name of knowledge, then we reject it as untrue. If it harmonizes we call it true. Should we discover in our reexamination of its nature in contact with reality that it appears to be true, though in disagreement with our system, then we examine anew the elements of the system, and revise them; and thus the nature of our conclusions change, knowledge increases, and we are said to approach the truth. In proportion as we reach a system whose judgments and inferences hang together in a harmonious whole, more or less in contact with concrete reality, we achieve that consistency which we make the mark of truth.

It is not strange, therefore, that when we examine the main characteristics of judgment and the laws of thought and inquire concerning their validity that we should reach again this same standard. The logician commonly speaks of universality and necessity as the chief characteristics of judgment. By the universality of judgment he means that its conclusions are assumed to be valid for everyone. On this basis all argument proceeds; the alternative is pure scepticism; and according to it, no standard of truth can exist and thought is at the mercy of the momentary judgment and caprice of the individual. These conclusions we freely admit, but inquire again to what standard we appeal. We naturally reply that, while scepticism may flourish in some academic circles for a time, in a vacuum where formal doubt can live, ~~that~~ the practical demands of our lives soon compel us to vacate it for a healthy gnosis. Scepticism soon involves us in so many practical inconsistencies in emergencies that call for immediate action based on certainty, that even the academically inclined is soon sick of this boon companion and his conduct inconsistent enough to permit of action based on practical certainty. Moreover, his attempt to make sceptical adherents reveals no foundation for appeal apart from that universality of judgment which to deny he has learned to be the height of inconsistency.

The second main characteristic of the judgment is generally called its necessity. By this is meant that when we judge we are not free to reach a conclusion by caprice. Some times we say we feel certain a thing is so, thus identifying ourselves with the judgment; but its necessity, in logical terms is due to its premises, the reasons which support it.

This merely means that it is consistent with facts we regard as true, with judgments previously made, and, as far as possible, verified. In ordinary life unreflective individuals do not make explicit the reasons supporting their judgments, but in order to make their necessity manifest the reasons must be made explicit, and thus the simple judgment expanded into an inference.

Inference, then, or reason, roots back in sense perception, which is never anything wholly apart from the mind, though on the other hand, never to be called "merely subjective." On that account it is not strange that the same criterion by which we judge the validity of sense-perception, should apply to the validity of the processes of reason. If we would properly evaluate an argument we commonly ask whether it be a consistent one. In formal logic we make appeal to the laws of thought, the law of identity, the law of contradiction, the law of the excluded middle. We commonly regard these as axiomatic principles, but we assume them, also, as the result of the demand for consistency. The law of identity is stated in several forms: "Whatever is, is; everything remains identical with itself; A is A." In logical discussion the terms are conceived of as having a permanent character; in practical life it is our experience with things that determines for us their character as permanent and unchanging, an experience involving a succession of judgments that must be mutually consistent. Reflection on the nature of the law of Identity makes it quite clear that it merely expresses the fundamental nature of judgment in so far as every judgment is, in its turn, the expression of an identity between subject and predicate.

The law of Contradiction is merely the negative form of the law of Identity, and in its use calls for the application of the same test of consistency. The law does not state that it is impossible to unite a and not-a in the sense of a and something different from a, but a and not-a in the sense that they are contradictory. But here again we note the relation of the theoretical to practical experience. To one who deals in abstractions, to the logic chopper whose intellectual legs are never long enough to reach to the ground, appeal to the practical is a source of horror and alarm; but reason as falling back on the

judgment, and the judgment as rooting back most largely in sense--perception must necessarily make appeal to the practical. This even the logicians of the day are recognizing. Relative to the matter under discussion Prof. Creighton writes: "It is not by any means easy to decide what things are merely different, and therefore compatible with each other, and what contradictory or opposed. Logic can give no rule which may be applied in every case. If experience shows that two things, or two properties, are at any time united, we say that they are merely different from each other; if they have never been found in conjunction and we are not able to conceive how their union could take place, we call them opposites or contradictories. It is worth noticing, too, that no terms are in themselves contradictory, except those which are in the form a and not-a, wise and not wise. But they become contradictory and exclude each other when they claim to occupy the same place, in some particular system of facts. Thus 'maple' and 'oak' denote trees of a different variety, which are however, so little opposed that they may exist side by side. If both these terms were applied to the same tree, however, they would become contradictory. By claiming to stand in the same relations, these terms become rivals, as it were, and exclude each other. But a knowledge of the particular facts involved is always necessary to determine whether or not two assertions are really incompatible." (An Introductory Logic, p. 297)

That is commonly known as the law of Excluded Middle is merely a corollary from the implications of the other two. Between contradictions there is no middle ground. B excludes not-B; every judgment plays a double function; it both affirms and denies. As has been said logic affords no rule for determining whether two things stand in relation of mutual exclusion. That is a matter for the practical judgment to decide; and it decides again in accord with the criterion of consistency applied in a practical way.

Again we point out, as in the case of the testimony of the senses, that the necessary adoption of consistency as a test is due both to a fundamental faith in the validity of the operations of the mind and the consistency of the universe upon the data of which the mind operates. Such a faith when rightly understood is no mere languid

acquiescence in a formal logical standard the acceptance of which carries with it no far reaching consequence, but one which involves a theory of the whole universe, it may be of its source, operation and final end.

Sceptics, like Hume, however, protest that an essential difference exists between the evidence of the senses and of thought. Hume maintained that all knowledge rests upon sensations. Ideas that reproduce percepts are to be regarded as representing valid knowledge; but their peculiar ability to combine with each other and produce new ideal constructions never presented in perceptual experience, he regarded as due to a propensity to feign, and such constructions were to him, therefore, vicious and invalid. But we have already seen that without the activity of thought there can be no sensations,--- a conclusion which T. H. Green in his Introduction to Hume substantiates with painstaking care-- and that if thought of a higher constructive nature be vicious, sensations must also be vicious. As in the case of sensations such thought will be judged by its consistency, consistency first between the ideas and conceptions viewed in abstraction, it may be, from sense experience; and consistency, secondly, as these conclusions work out in experience and are thus related again by actual contact with objective reality. If in practical experience a system of thought continues to cohere without sign of unharmonious and contradictory elements we shall continue to regard it as true; if not we must declare it false and make necessary readjustment.

D. Certainty With Regard to the Testimony of the Feelings.

In the vocabulary of certainty no terms are used with greater frequency than those which relate to the feelings. "I feel sure", "I feel absolutely certain," "I feel convinced," are constantly changing forms of statement involving the feelings. We are never more certain of truth than when we say, "We feel certain." This is due, a little reflection convinces us, to the fact, that vigorous action of any kind is possible only when strong feelings urge it; and that practical action is ever more decided and resolute, where certainty of its need is greatest. As preliminary certainty begets feeling and feeling action, so action enlarging the evidence at hand makes for greater certainty.

Indeed, without action of some kind, conscious or unconscious, willed or indeliberate, certainty would not be generated. The certainties of the child arise from the instinctive and unconscious movements of the limbs and other organs of sense which furnish the data upon which his mind plays, gradually organizing the evidence into a whole, and more or less applying the test of consistency.

But in what sense does the existence of strong feeling validate our conclusions regarding the truth? To determine this matter an analysis of the nature of feeling, including the higher emotions, is necessary. We have defined sensations as those elemental conscious processes which are connected with bodily processes in definite bodily organs. In their simplest form they imply mental activity as well as external stimuli with their consequent impressions in the sensibility. An idea is a mental construction involving a complex of such sensations. An affection is a conscious state involving pleasantness or unpleasantness, arising from sensation or idea. But it is contrasted with sensation in that it has subjective rather than objective bearing; it is coextensive with consciousness rather than local; it is killed by repetition of stimulus, rather than thus interwoven into the texture of the mind; it is eliminated by the concentration of attention upon it, rather than thus made clearer; and finally, as sensation is stronger peripherally, it is stronger centrally. What we know as feeling is a complex process, comprised on the one hand of perception and idea, and on the other of affection, in which affection plays the principal part. The feelings necessarily issue in bodily expression either in instinctive and spontaneous ways or in consciously determined and perhaps systematic action. As relating themselves to lower types of sensation we think of them as including the special feelings; as related to more complex ideas, involving cognition, judgment, memory, in a word, apperception, we call them the emotions.

When now it is asked what gives valid nature to the certainty that inheres in feeling we respond that this is not found in the physical aspect of feeling, but in the intellectual. The same test applied to thought in general, must be applied to the ideal elements in feeling. If these be consistent one with another and with the other constituents of experience, then we will call the feeling valid; if not, then lacking proper

validity. This avoids the difficulties provided by the superficail irregular, and transient elements in our feelings. On the other hand, room is made here also for those high and constant feelings the outcome of which is ever the enriching and ennobling of life. Insofar as this result be looked upon as giving evidence of the nature of ultimate reality, they must be looked upon as affording data for metaphysical inquiry. At the same time it is consistency to which we finally appeal.

E. Certainty in its Relation to the Testimony of the Moral Nature.

Among expressions of Certainty current among men none is more emphatically indicative of assurance than, "It must be so." "It ought to be so, and therefore it is," is another form of the same conclusion. Has such certainty genuine validity? The expression is generally used of a factor presumably somewhere existent, but not immediately ascertainable through the senses. It is implied, however, in the factors of a system already experienced, a system that would not be complete without the existence of the missing factor. Therefore we conclude that necessarily the missing factor is in existence also. Here the appeal again is to consistency. If consistency is a valid test of truth, and certain known factors consistently point to the existence of another unknown or partially known factor, then it must necessarily exist.

This of course implies also that the universe is an essentially honest one. The value of the testimony of sense or of thought or feeling depends on this very fact. If the world in relation to sense were so constructed as to make for error then the application of the canon of consistency would be of no avail in giving us the truth; and so also with thought and feeling. Our senses sometimes deceive us; but the deception is only discovered by the employment of the same instruments, the use of which brought us into error, with the faith that the deception was due to their illicit, and will be corrected by their proper functioning. Our processes of reasoning sometimes go awry and yield us falsehood, but this is discovered only as again we use the same reason, properly guarding its operations. But should the universe be so arranged that, by the employment of our faculties, now one conclusion could be reached and now another entirely

contradictory from product, the same operation, the standard of consistency would have no value, and its use would never bring us to truth. Universal scepticism would necessarily result. Formal doubt of the authoritiveness of our test and the validity of truth, so-called, is always possible but in Bradley's words, (Appearance and Reality p. 137) "The doubt is seen when we reflect to be founded on that which it endeavours to question and it has but blindly born witness to the absolute certainty of our knowledge about reality."

Consistency then, is our absolute criterion of truth, a standard, the application of which depends upon faith in the honesty of the universe. Faith cannot be said, as in common thought, to be something that is added to knowledge but something that is the very presupposition of the attainment of knowledge. Moreover, the test of consistency is not applied, supported by faith, in a vacuum but to a content whose material is obtained, not merely by passive observation, but by active, determined search. While consistency is the formal test of truth, a material test is also necessary, the presence of all available material to which the test should be applied. It is possible that the test be applied to a limited content and yield false conclusions, rectified later by the increase of the material, and the reapplication of the test. It is only, therefore, when the mind has been open to all available material, when this has been consistently dealt with, when the conditions of further increase of material have been observed, when none of the data has been blinked for individual reasons, and a determined effort has been made to include all the evidence, that the sense of certainty may be looked upon as valid. Much will depend upon the character of the seeker, and the willingness to be led into further realms of truth whatever its attainment will cost. If this should also prove true of Christian certainty, there will, therefore, be no cause for surprise.

We note again that such search and such life, at times first the results of instinct, although afterward of conscious purpose, presupposes again honesty and consistency on the part of the universe. If peradventure, of necessity, accidentally or with malice aforethought, its regular processes were deceptive the test of consistency would be of no avail. Such faith in the essential honesty of the universe is as rational as reason, since reason's

criterion presupposes its existence. To venture on such faith is as rational as making application of consistency as a test.

The existence of such faith is as much a primary datum as a material fact. It is as much an expression of the nature of the world energy as a so-called objective thing. Considered from one point of view, as we have said, the constitution of our mental nature is a subjective matter; but from another it is also objective; and if the inorganic and animal universe testify to the nature of ultimate reality why should not the whole cosmos of rational life and mental processes? If now it be asked how shall we distinguish between this fundamentally rational faith and other faiths possibly irrational, we reply by correlating them with new facts, if possible, in the flow of experience, as we shall see in a moment, and again applying the test of consistency.

F. The Criterion of Certainty: Consistency Pragmatically Defined.

Thus far our examination of the various constituents of our nature, abstractly considered, has all pointed to consistency as the test of truth. But what do we mean by consistency? This to some who know its current meaning seems a superficial question. It is a state of compatibility and harmony between facts in a system of reality or propositions in a system of thought. In logical terms it implies the absence of contradiction. But how shall we know when we have found it? Absolutists like F. H. Bradley think it impossible of achievement save by the absolute mind. An investigation of his definition of the term in his "Appearance and Reality," yields most remarkable results. He says, for instance, p.132, 'Everything so far, which we have seen has turned out to be appearance. It is that which taken as it stands proves inconsistent as it stands, and for this reason cannot be true of the real.'

p. 187. "Now appearance is content not at one with its existence, a 'what' loosened from its 'that'. And in this sense we have seen that every truth is appearance since in it we have divorce of quality from being."

p.455. "There is but one Reality and its being consists in experience. In this one whole all appearances come together, they in varying degrees lose their distinctive natures.

The essence of reality lies in the union and agreement of existence and content, and on the other side appearance consists in the discrepancy between these two aspects. And reality in the end belongs to nothing but the single real. For take anything no matter what it is, which is less than the absolute, and the inner discrepancy at once proclaims that what you have taken is appearance. The alleged reality divides itself and falls apart into two jarring factors. The 'what' and the 'that' are plainly two sides which turn out not to be the same, and this difference inherent in every finite fact entails its disruption. As long as the content stands for something other than its own intent and meaning, as long as the existence is actually less or more than what it essentially must imply, so long we are concerned with mere appearance and not with genuine reality."

p.148. "I may say for the present that taken in the abstract the practical standard seems to be the same as that is used for theory. It is individuality, the harmonious and consistent existence of our contents; an existence further, which cannot be limited because, if so, it would contradict itself internally."

p. 542 "Our criterion is individuality or the idea of a complete system."

These extracts give us a fairly clear notion of what Bradley means by consistency and inconsistency. To him, "inconsistency" means "content not at one with its existence," "a 'what' loosened from its 'that'," "a divorce of quality from being," which constitute an inner discrepancy. That he means by this is clear enough; but it contains unwarranted assumptions hidden in his definition of terms that necessarily carry his conclusions with them. If the assumptions are removed the conclusions fall. We notice first the assumption that thought has the power to separate the "what" and the "that" or content from existence, which he himself, in another connection, declares inseparable; that thought has the power in a judgment to apply a content belonging to one existence to another. But why should anyone suppose that the idea of a reality and the idea of a quality should ever coalesce when the nature of the ideas prohibits their identity? Naturally because they do not belong together they will not come together. Here, then, we have a failure in thought and in judgment, an inconsistency that must be surmounted in the absolute. For where else can inconsistencies be surmounted? Does not Bradley postulate his absolute for this

purpose? But how such inconsistency is resolved in the absolute he does not point out. In reply to Bradley's assumption it should be noted in the first place that thought's power of abstraction is ideal only. When we use the term "ideal', moreover, we do not use it in Bradley's sense. To Bradley an idea is "a quality made loose from its own existence' and working free from implication from that. To us an idea, if it be an idea of quality, is the conception of a quality made loose from its own existence. But other ideas are possible. They may include conceptions of quality plus existence. Thought can never be the same as its object, for by definition subject and object are always implied. The nearest we approach such a state is in self-consciousness, but no one would conclude here that the thought of self is oneself. But to Bradley, because subject and object are by definition other-- were they not they would not be subject and object--- we have, therefore, an inconsistency which must be resolved in the absolute.

We get closer to the nature of the fallacy under which Bradley labors when we consider his discussion of the nature of judgment, which he introduces to make clear his explanation of the relations of the 'what' and the 'that'. "In judgment," he says, "an idea is predicated of a reality." "The point is", he says again, "whether with every judgment we do not find an aspect of existence, absent from the predicate but present in the subject, and whether in the synthesis of these aspects we have not got the essence of judgment. Judgment is essentially the reunion of two sides 'what' and 'that', provisionally estranged." Time is not given here to enter into a long discussion on the nature of the judgment. Bradley's notion is the old one that a judgment is a proposition made up of three parts, subject, predicate and copula. In positive judgments the last joins the others,in negative separates them. Bearing on the general matter we submit this paragraph from Creighton, "An Introductory Logic. p.271. "The view which regards the judgment as a compound of two parts-- subject and predicate-- rests upon the substitution of words for thoughts, It analyzes the proposition (the verbal or written expression of the judgment) instead of the judgment itself, In the proposition the parts do exist independently of each other. The subject usually stands first and is followed by the predicate. But there is no such order of parts in a judgment. When one judges'it is raining' or 'this

is a drum," the piece of knowledge is one, and indivisible. And the act by which this knowledge is gained is not an external process of joining one part to another, but is an intellectual reaction by which he recognizes that something not previously understood, has a certain meaning or significance." We should say, then, in response to Bradley's statement, of the relation of the 'what' and the 'that' in judgment that judgment is really a process of pointing out in the predicate (which by the way may be a 'that' as well as a 'what',e.g. "This horse is a white horse"), what was evidently present but before unnoticed in the subject. It is not a real alienation of the 'what' and the 'that', but an affirmation by the ideal power of thought that they are combined in the subject in factual unity.

Referring again to the quotations which indicate Bradley's notion of consistency, we notice that by it he means further, "individuality", "the harmonious existence of our contents in an unlimited whole, otherwise they would contradict themselves internally." But consistency as absolute harmony, individuality, all inclusiveness, infinity, we never reach, and consequently we can never know what consistency really is. To apply it as a test is, therefore, impossible: we can never compare the finite idea with infinite truth.

This in substance is the charge the pragmatist makes against all absolutist systems of thought. We are not to be held as supporting all that so-called pragmatists have said in defining and defending that attitude and those conclusions generally gathered together under the term "Pragmatism." Prof. Lovejoy, in more or less good faith, enumerates seventeen different kinds, and Prof. James, one of its most brilliant exponents, is by no means always consistent in his expositions of it as a system of thought. We subscribe to that which follows, however, which is a synopsis of the case for pragmatism as presented by Prof. A. W. Moore in his work, "Pragmatism and Its Critics,"

As a theory of knowledge designed to become a test of truth, pragmatism is an outcome of modern scientific method, and a reaction against idealistic absolutism. Against absolutism it brings a charge involving two principal counts. First absolutism furnishes no satisfactory criterion for the determination of truth; secondly it shows no interest

in, or vital connection with our practical affairs, the demands of which brought it into being. Pragmatists in general believe that the search for correlation between things and unity throughout all is the outcome of an intellectual demand for knowledge of the laws of the universe that should make possible a better control of the elements of individual and social experience. And as Plato argued for the existence of a metaphysical world of universal and immutable reality to save society from the disintegrating evil of Sophistical scepticism, so the modern absolutist, to find fixity in this changing world, to gain the authority of an all-embracing truth in the face of anarchical scepticism, evolved the doctrine of the absolute, and now ignores the very practical demand that brought absolutism into being.

In general the absolutist makes the universe the product of an absolute mind, holding past, present, and future in indivisible unity, an eternal idea, comprehending all that has been, all that is, and all that will be. This makes the universe static. Progress may seem to be going on in time, but as time is only phenomenal, progress is apparent not real. The duty of the search for truth, then, involves approximation to the absolute idea, making man's ideas copies of it. But this the seeker after truth can never accomplish, as his mind is finite, as his mental processes are many not one, and occur in succession. Yet absolute truth we know there is affording a safe haven from universal scepticism.

Now ensues a rapid fire of question and answer between the pragmatist and the absolutist which serves to bring out the pragmatists position with clearness and force. Pragmatist: Why is it a duty to search after the absolute truth when you can never attain it? Absolutist: Because from its possession, even though not absolute, high practical values result.

Pragmatist: What do you mean when you say that some ideas are true and some are false? Absolutist: Our ideas are true when they coincide with the absolute thought and false when they do not; relatively true in proportion as they coincide; and relatively false as they do not. The true idea is the one which would require the least revision,

the least change, to make it coincide with the immutable reality.

Pragmatist: And how shall we know when they do or do not coincide, more or less? We appeal to the facts, the plain everyday facts of history and science. If we wish to know what ideas would suffer the least revision by the absolute reality we have simply to go to history and science, and observe, as a matter of fact , what ideas and judgments have been and are being, revised.

Here the pragmatist temporarily rests his case, believing that its force is based in the answer he has drawn from the absolutist. What we call truth is an ideal abstract of the working of the universe as we find it. If the universe be phenomenal, representing some more ultimate reality back of it, such operation is an expression of its nature, and, if fundamental reality be personal, of its purpose. If there be any question of the validity of truth as we hold it, then apparent truth must be related back to the facts, either new or old. The pragmatic attempt is merely to test apparently consistent conclusions by correlating them to new or old facts in changing experiences. If the universe be a consistent one-- and only thus is the test of consistency of any worth-- then truth will work in the sense that experiment will reveal it as agreeing with the workings of the universe, the nature of the physical world, inorganic or organic, and the constitution of human nature. If the old conclusions harmonize with the new facts, our certainty of their truth grows; if not, we must make new search and possibly revision. It is a matter of fact that in human life a theory can hardly be made to work unless first it is accounted true; but it is also a matter of fact that unless true, however first accounted true, in the long run it will not work, as not squaring with the practical situation in which it is applied. As a consequence a preliminary test is generally one of consistency in ideas; a second test is an experiment to see how a theory will work, of consistency in practice. Many times, indeed, a theory, apparently inconsistent in idea, working out in practice, will unearth new data, making it quite clear that instead of being inconsistent in theory, it is quite consistent here also.

Summarizing, now, the results of our discussion, we should say that a valid general certainty depended on the presupposition of faith in the honesty of the universe; an attitude of the will, the willingness to know the truth and increase our data; and finally the application of a test, consistency as related to the data of experience. If we demand these for the establishment of certainty in general, it will not appear strange if they are needed also for the establishment of Christian certainty at the nature of which we shall now take a glance.

Part II. The Nature of Christian Certainty in Relation to Certainty in General.

We have canvassed the grounds of certainty in general. It is now necessary to ask what we mean by the specifically Christian certainty, and what, if any, is its relation to certainty in general. When we speak of Christian certainty we instinctively include a more or less definite area of propositions and experiences of which the Christian feels as certain as he does of anything: belief in the existence of God, an infinite Person, altogether good, who in holy love and loving righteousness and justice, creates, sustains, and orders all; the facts of revelation, including the incarnation ~~of Jesus~~ and the existence of the Trinity. We think of Christianity's teaching concerning man's nature as sinful and needing redemption; as an heir of immortality with its natural consequences in eternal welfare and condemnation. We think of the facts of Christian experience, and the processes of faith, conviction, repentance, regeneration and sanctification. Restrained by the limits of our paper, we can deal with these alone. To exhibit them in their mutual coherence and congruity-- if as in the case of certainty in general, consistency be the test that must be applied to the Christian certainty-- is a task that requires the utmost condensation. Volumes have been written on each of these subjects, and even on minor details connected with them. To establish their consistency, as we have defined it, is to establish the Christian certainty. But having done even this we shall fall short of logical completeness. To attain the latter we should also have to consider Christianty's teaching concerning man, not only as an individual, but also in the social aggregate, and of its programme for him in this social capacity with its description of the nature of the Kingdom of Heaven. We should also have to consider the nature of his cooperative labors in church and state for Christianity's extension. Finally we should have to examine the conviction that in its essentials Christianity will never be superseded, that whatever are the changing conditions of human existence, the gospel message and method of life will be adequate for them all.

We note in the first place that part of the objects of the Christian certainty, as for example, the belief in personal Deity, are also objects of certainty in general. They are presuppositions of Christian experience, concluded to be true, on the basis of which the

venture of the Christian life is made. By common consent entrance into that life does not radically change the nature of our mental processes, or the standards by which we judge of truth. It introduces us into a new sphere of evidence that may change our conception of the truth, but does not change its criteria. When one enters the Christian life it is in response to the demands of sense, of thought, and of moral conviction, and as in the case of the extension of the sphere of evidence in the realm of natural certainty, it is by an effort of the will, by a practical venture that for its subject is in the nature of an experiment. Consistency operating in a vacuum would yield but little truth: it is but the formal condition of knowledge. The material condition is the evidence afforded by experience, and if the natural man deliberately refuses to embark upon a new sea of evidence because of the personal cost involved, if he does not respond to the demands of consistency, as applied to evidence from sense, thought, feeling, and moral conviction, he need not complain that the criterion does not yield him the same results as it does the Christian.

At the same time for the Christian there is no other standard of truth. The senses may be purified and so yield more luminous evidences; thought may be quickened and mental insight enlarged; feeling may be deepened and enobled; moral conviction grow more intense in the struggle of maintaining the integrity of the Christian life; and the field of evidence largely increase. Yet few Christians have laid claim to any direct divine illumination, any magic increase of insight, any immediate powers of intuition other than those common to man's normal intellectual and emotional nature. What H. C. Sheldon says on this subject in relation to the direct intuition of God will apply equally well to all so-called directly intuitive knowledge. "If the intuition or direct mental vision is regarded as common to men, it ought to have secured a much more uniform conception of the divine nature than is found to have actually existed. If the intuition is allowed to be exceptional, an explanation of its limited presence may reasonably be asked for. Moreover, there is a certain intrinsic difficulty in conceiving of such an intuition. A limited mind, though it undoubtedly has the thought of the infinite cannot be regarded as competent actually to see the infinite. An intuition of God in His infinitude is therefore excluded. But if the

intuition is not of God in His infinitude, it is of something less than God. This lesser something may indeed partially reveal God by way of token or suggestion; but it cannot be anything more than a limited theophany presented to the inner vision. Such a theophany, as well as any other partial disclosure, would need to be supplemented by rational inference; and the question could be raised whether it would be a surer ground of inference than that which is provided in nature and in the moral constitution of man. It would in any case need to be well coordinated with a system of objective reality before assurance could be given that it was due to anything more than a peculiar subjective affection." (System of Christian Doctrine,p.72)

Such a conclusion is not only in the line of rational inference, but in accord with the practical needs of the case in presenting the truth to others, and follows the teaching of Divine revelation. The need of embarking on the great Christian experiment for the increase of data makes fair appeal to his reason, when a standard no different, and therefore not incomprehensible, is urged. Sufficient witness can be produced reliable enough to to incite to the venture as in any other field of scientific discovery; and the decision made to depend on the self-evidencing power of the new experience.

That professes to be Divine revelation, also, calls for the progressive increase of certainty by the enlargement of knowledge by efforts of the will in practical activity. The invitation of the Psalmist is, "Taste and see that the Lord is good." The teaching of the Old Testament on this point may be summed up in the words,"Then shall we know, if we follow on to know the Lord." At no one time can society or the individual be looked upon as possessing all the truth. Insofar as Bradley is thinking of the possession of all possible data, and so must postulate an absolute mind,his definition of consistency, in terms of a peculiar, all-embracing individuality is sound. "I have yet many things to say unto you", said Jesus to his disciples, who were growing in their ability to apprehend his teaching, but who needed the turn of practical affairs to make them sensitive and receptive, "but ye cannot bear them now." "Not by their roots, but by their fruits", is Prof. James paraphrase of the oft-repeated words of Jesus. Christianity presents itself to-day as the result of

the progressive unfoldment of a revelation extending over centuries. Only on fundamentals does it take a final position. Of other realms of reality it says, "Now we look through a glass darkly." Said Jesus at the feast of the tabernacles, indicating the material standard by which one can attain certainty relative to Christian fundamentals, "He that willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching whether it be of God or whether I speak of myself." In saying this he took it for granted that the achieving of truth was conditioned upon the proper attitude in life to the practical issues. Insofar as we live in accord with the truth, as it becomes apparent to us, we grow in ability further to attain it. Words of the apostles, a few of which we quote may be similarly construed, "Prove all things," says St. Paul. "hold fast to that which is good, abstain from every form of evil," in these words implying the practical nature of the test. Likewise St. John says, "Beloved, believe not every spirit, but prove the spirits whether they are of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the world; and then he sets a test which has generally, though not always, proved an eminently practical one. In like manner the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews exhorts, "Take head, brethen, lest haply there should be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief," also implying that continued hold upon truth is dependent upon our practical attitude toward it.

Now such a venture, either in new experiences that furnish additional data, or in the reapplication of the criterion of consistency, does not proceed without the exercise of the same kind of faith which we concluded was prerequisite to certainty in general. In the latter case it meant a self-committal to truth as an ideal; in the Christian sense it means a self-committal to the person of God as revealed in Christ of whose nature truth is merely the expression. In both cases such a faith is something more and deeper than an intellectual assent to any given number of propositions; it is a presupposition,- and personal dedication to it,--involving the honesty of the universe, that alone makes knowledge and certainty possible; without which existence is an enigma, a joke, a huge farce, devoid of either meaning or explanation. But in the Christian sense, instead of being directed toward an impersonal honesty pervading the universe, the faith is in a Person of Whose nature honesty is the expression, and who therefore may be looked upon both as the cause of this fundamental honesty or consistency.

and the guarantee of its continuance.

If faith in the essential honesty of the universe, an attitude of will issuing in activity of the life in accord with knowledge already gained to increase the amount of evidence, and continued application of the criterion of consistency, are needed for the establishment of certainty in general, we need not be surprised that they are needed for the establishment of Christian certainty. Each of these fundamental elements has its own implications, which we will consider as we apply the test of consistency to the fundamental positions of Christian thought and life. The field here, however, is so vast that what we say can only be suggestive and implies a wide understanding of all the issues at stake and the evidence at hand. On many of the points of interest on which we cannot touch huge volumes have been written. But all any of these efforts can do is to show an open and persistent mind to all available evidence and to indicate its place in a presumably consistent system; a constant correlation of new results with evidence that has already been gained, and again the application of the criterion of consistency as we have already defined it.

But why should we conclude that there is always the same relation between the theoretical and the practical in the field of the religious life as in the sphere of the material world, so that knowledge of how theories work gives indication of how the world is actually constituted? In reply we point out that much of the evidence put to the test of consistency is ~~a~~ the outcome of desire, impulse, and conscious and determined search to satisfy the religious instincts as well as the instinct for theoretic truth. Such religious instincts, when permanent and regular, are to be conceived as the outcome of the operations of ultimate reality as much as is the constitution of our strictly intellectual nature. The religious--or rather irreligious--sceptic inquires scornfully, "Why should it be imagined that the whole universe was built for the welfare of man, the upbuilding of his moral and spiritual nature?" To be sure without such faith civilization might soon collapse, morality might soon be no more, and the race, perhaps, soon become extinct, but what of it? What relation has such outcome to truth? It might as well be asked, "Why should it be [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] built to correspond to the cognitive instincts of man, to respond

to the test of consistency." Measured in terms of numbers, those interested in the purely intellectual are comparatively few. Suppose speculative interest should cease: Why should truth, so-called, be regarded as any-thing more than a great desideratum? The adequate answer in both cases is, not merely that human life, would come to a standstill without response to both instincts, but that the results gained from response to their impulse justify themselves in experience. A close relation, such as one would expect, if all phases of life were built together in unity and consistency, is seen to exist between the true and the good, between theistic and Christian conceptions of the universe and admittedly higher phases of human life; and contrarivise between atheistic conceptions and the admittedly lower forms of human life. We conclude that our theories of the natural world are true when we find that the actual operation of the "objective" world illustrates and confirms them. By the same logic we must conclude that our metaphysical theories are true, not only when they are illustrated and confirmed by what we call the natural and material universe, but by the world of human nature which is one function of a whole objective order. It is a matter of fact that in human life a theory can hardly be made to work unless first it is accounted true; but it is also a matter of fact that, unless true, however first accounted true, in the long run it will not work, as it sets out to work, as not squaring with the nature of the practical situation in which it is applied. Thus the tests of theory and practice must continually supplement each other, and the truth determined by consistency between the parts of each respectively and between each other. If in construing the universe morally and spiritually religion be accused of anthropomorphism, science in construing it logically and rationally is open to the same charge. The form of this statement is due to the nature of the common disjunction between religion and science. Better, because far truer, is the statement that we cannot deny our nature in any part; that it, in its highest and most constant aspects, is an indication of the nature of ultimate reality; and that of the many kinds of anthropomorphisms possible, since some kind is necessary, that is most consistent which is forced on us by fidelity to the facts.

Part III. The Application of the Criterion of Certainty to Christian Experience.

A. To the "Objective" Truths of the Christian System.

1. Belief in God.

Belief in God, as an infinite Person, limited, if at all, by self-imposed restrictions, altogether holy, who in perfect love creates, sustains, and orders all, is the cardinal truth of the Christian system. Granting this, all else may easily follow; denying or doubting this, Christianity is no more. Is belief in God consistent with all the data that the experience of the individual and the race affords? In accord with the analysis that has gone before, consistency must be the test, faith in an honest universe, the presupposition, and a willingness to obtain all available data the moral characteristic of the investigator. Deeper than these none can go; and without them there can be no progress in certainty. But, in their turn, these have their deep-lying implications. They are expressions of the profoundest constitution of human nature. It surely is an expression of the nature of ultimate reality. As we have said, considered apart from individual irregularities and peculiarities, it has its objective validity as a piece of evidence. If any material fact is to be regarded as a piece of valid evidence so must the nature of the human mind. If it be looked upon as bearing a possibly false message, so also must the physical fact. Indeed, if the former be under suspicion, then doubly so the latter, as less immediate than the former, as at one farther removed from the most fundamental experience of self-consciousness and self-activity. For our only knowledge of physical fact is dependent upon the experience of self-activity, giving assurance of our own existence, and the interplay of that activity with activity from without; just as the knowledge of the existence of other persons is dependent upon the interplay of their activities and ours. In other words the category of causality is an expression of our active nature, as it may be that the category of substance or being is the expression of our more passive self-consciousness. If then we can think at all of the existence and activity of any ultimate reality it is only because we believe in the honesty of the universe, of which the whole of human nature may rightly be called a function; and seize upon the clue afforded by our nature. No reason exists, furthermore, why in similar manner we should not conclude concerning similar aspects of its nature, granting that we make due allowance for our limitations and its infinitude, our

possibly inferior choices and its possibly superior creative activities. The adoption of consistency as a test, moreover, postulates consistency in the nature of the world-ground. As Bradley points out, in its highest form and at least in some sense, consistency means individuality and comprehensiveness. It points to unity on the part of the ultimate reality. This need not mean unity of being necessarily, a substance without any interior distinctions or substances without mutually interior distinctions, but certainly points to oneness of purpose and of activity. Otherwise consistency has no worth as a test.

With equal legitimacy, if in consistency there be needed as an explanation of experience, we can postulate personality, self-consciousness and self-direction of the ultimate reality; indeed ethical intensity with all the higher characteristics summed up under the term "holy love." Actually, without such postulate, we cannot consistently explain our own existence. Our experience of activity convinces us that the operating power to produce an effect varies in accord with the product desired, but is always, in a real sense, adequate. So also must it be, we conclude, with the ultimate reality. If personality, ethical intensity, holy love are parts of our nature, then they must also, in some sense inhere in the cause. We cannot otherwise explain the peculiar fundamental nature of our mental life and experience. At bottom this rests on self-consciousness involving a duality of subject and object. Can unconsciousness bring forth self-consciousness? Can absolute unity without interior distinctions bring forth a duality of subject and object? Can chance or necessity bring forth freedom? Can ethical indifference bring forth righteousness, or selflessness, unselfish love? One can think of no reason why we have a right to postulate in ultimate reality the existence of qualities corresponding to the consciously lower, though these be regarded as essential, and not to the higher, if these be regarded as just as essential.

We have put what we may call the argument from human nature first because all the others, the argument from interaction, the cosmological, teleological, moral, and religious, depend upon it. The argument from interaction postulates the existence of an absolute, which though immanent in the interacting parts of a system, is yet also, in some sense, transcendent. It must be neither one of the parts nor their mere sum. Such a demand arises primarily from the

conscious experience of a personality in control of its voluntary organs, a system of interacting parts, in which, in the mystery of psychophysical unity, it is both immanent and transcendent. It is neither one of the members, or like a dead body, their aggregate. Secondarily, the argument is the result of the experience of putting together parts of a machine, whose operations are immanently guided by the purposive idea and transcendently directed by the creative personality.

The cosmological argument is merely a narrow form of that from interaction. It demands a cause, and an adequate cause, to explain the existence of the world, the inorganic, and the organic, the material, plant, animal, and human, severally functions of a whole, the others no less objective in their natures than any one. It is no sufficient criticism of this argument to say, as one has said. (Schultz: Outlines of Christian Apologetics, p.104) "To our thought, inseparably bound up as it is, with the law of causality, the right must be denied of making assertions concerning a being that is to be thought of as exempt from precisely this law." But such exemption is conceived to be due to the fact that this cause is self-sufficient and eternally existing, a truly first cause, not involved, as is a secondary, in a causal nexus, but thought of as the presupposition of the whole. In this the mind can consistently rest as it could not in an eternal regress.

The teleological argument, or argument from design, roots back in our own purposive experiences. This does not militate against it any more than the fact that our experiences of individuality and consistency furnish us our intellectual criterion. Reaching out, we find apparent signs of design operating in the world, and, if we discover nothing apparently decisive to the contrary, we must conclude in favor of design; for apparent signs are all the signs we have one way or the other. At great length, and with greater skill and surpassing insight, Janet has worked out the argument in his great classic, "Final Causes". A subpoena to evolution and natural selection has not broken down its testimony. Evolution is but the description of a process whose beginning and end can only be accounted for on a theistic basis, and Darwin himself could not explain the tendencies to variation without the aid of purpose. To call upon chance is to discount scientific law--which is nothing but a

description of what regularly happens without, in response to experience of what regularly happens within - and to fly in the face of experience. To avoid the duty of necessity is to fall back upon ignorance, and to start upon an eternal round where the problem at the end is where it was with us in the beginning of our recession.

When we demand, moreover, an ethical nature in the absolute to explain our moral nature and justify its categorical commands, we but respond to the demands of consistency. So Sidgwick concludes in his masterly work on "The Methods of Ethics" (p.472) "Still to all this it is fairly and conclusively replied that the existence of these, however elevated desires, does not furnish a proof of the existence of their object: indeed, it can scarcely afford a strong presumption in favor of this conclusion considering a large proportion of human desires experience shows destined to disappointment. But it must be urged again that we do not fully conceive the argument in favor of the assumption that we are now considering, if we merely represent this as satisfying certain desires. We have rather to regard it as an hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental contradiction in a vast system of beliefs: a contradiction so fundamental that if it cannot be overcome the whole system must fall to the ground and scepticism be triumphant over one chief department of our thought." So finally also when we call for an object for the high satisfaction of our religious natures we merely ask for what genuine consistency demands. We speak not now of superficial, irregular, and transient desires, impulses, and feelings, but profound and permanent expressions of human nature on its consciously highest plane; not merely the product of one age, place, or atmosphere, but of all times and climes, and often arising from the most fetid moral conditions; expressions of human nature, that, if the trend of our reasoning be sound, are also expressions of the nature of the absolute. Abandoning these we must abandon consistency: and abandoning consistency, we abandon everything rational.

It may be replied, as it has been replied, that such conclusion is possible alone on the basis of a tremendous faith, and demands further the continuance of a great practical venture to justify it. Our response is that, though not always discerned, the most superficial application of the canon of consistency at bottom implies a similarly tremendous faith, generally overlooked because the practical risks are small; and in its essential nature, as great a practical venture, though no degree of heroism be involved.

It remains far as to inquire whether any form of impersonalism will consistently explain ourselves and the universe. Sidgwick for instance hints at this (as do other when they talk of the "suprapersonal--whatever that may be) when speaking of the fundamental moral intuitions: (Methods of Ethics p.470) "I find that I undoubtedly seem to perceive as clearly and certainly as I see any axiom in Arithmetic and Geometry that it is right and 'reasonable' and the 'dictate of reason', and 'my duty' to treat every man as I should think that I myself ought to be treated in precisely similar circumstances, and to do what I believe to be ultimately conducive to Universal Good or Happiness." To hold these, however, in consistency, he must believe in the existence of a supreme being who will adequately reward him for obeying the rule of duty or punish him for violating it; or in the existence of an impersonal Law that gives guarantee of such reward and punishment." In a foot-note he remarks (p,470) "It is not necessary, if we are simply considering ethics as a possibly independent science, to throw the fundamental premise of which we are now examining the validity into a Theistic form. Nor does it always seem to have taken that form in the support which Positive Religion has given to Morality. In the Buddist Creed this notion of the rewards inseparably attaching to right conduct seems to have developed in a far more elaborate and systematic manner than it has in any phase of Christianity. But as conceived by enlightened Buddhists these rewards are not distributed by the volition of a Supreme Person, but by the Natural Operation of an impersonal Law."

Let it be said in the first place that in any discussion which goes down to the nature of ultimate reality, ethics or any other discipline cannot be considered as a possibly independent science. Consistency requires that it and its conclusions must be related to all other fields of knowledge, made harmonious with these or modified. Too often the scientist starts on his investigation with metaphysical presuppositions that are no necessary outcome of his science or any other. If the business of the scientist is to register the coexistences and sequences of the phenomenal order, and not to attempt to explain them ultimately, then the moment he reads his postulates into his conclusions he transgresses on the sphere of philosphy and surrenders his scientific authority.

In the light of the nature of thought and the widest experience is it possible to speak consistently of the natural operation of impersonal Law? The conception of natural law is but an abstraction from the regular operations of our lives, the self-chosen regularity of our several personalities and, as Ward points out, arises by analogy from civil law. The term in its common use presupposes a self-running universe in accord with a fixed method. But law is merely the statement of the nature of a process; it initiates or concludes nothing; it is not a source of efficiency. The enforcement of human law depends on personality. On what does the operation of so-called natural law depend? Only three explanations are possible; on chance, necessity, or personality.

To explain the world by chance has now become so grotesque as to meet everywhere with ridicule. Chance and consistency are mutual enemies. In a world where chance rules and anything may happen, consistency can hardly be expected. Law, of which we are trying to give some explanation, and chance are incompatible and mutually contradictory; where chance reigns there can be no law. We need merely appeal to the time-worn illustration of the impossibility of a series of throws of fonts of type producing an Iliad to scout the possibility of chance producing a universe.

Our second recourse is to necessity. But with appeal to necessity to account for law all intellectual life and all genuine moral life must disappear. If so-called moral action is absolutely determined, then true human responsibility disappears. If the universe proceeds by necessity, then, as thought is but the product of the movement of atoms, valid distinctions between truth and falsehood disappear. What we know as error is as necessary as what we call truth: no standards of truth are of any genuine value. The apparent poising of the mind and balancing of evidence, the application of a criterion, the influence of our character as it opens or bars the door to new evidence, all this is as mechanically determined as the movements of the parts of a machine without regard to the mind which constructed it. But the primary witness of our own experience is that of causal activity and self-direction; and to impose upon ourselves the abstractions of our own regular operations, used for practical purposes to clarify the operations of the universe without, is to proceed in an

order reverse to the testimony of experience. Taking the clue from our own experience, the regularities of which, as far as its abiding elements are concerned, are as objective as any possible elements from the world without, for definition's sake we may concede that what we call the natural, is a description of what happens without, and conclude, if this appear consistent, that the regularity is one personally directed. What we call the natural will, therefore, be the uniform in the operations of infinite personality, and what we call the miraculous a departure from such uniformity.

On no other but personal grounds can we adequately explain the nature of the categories. It is because he attempts to explain these in abstraction from personality that Bradley finds so many theoretical inconsistencies in what to us, as matter of experience, is practically so consistent. Unity, personally interpreted, is the expression of self-conscious oneness over against the plurality of mental operations and states; identity is the consciousness of such unity, persisting amid all change, the self-equality of intelligence throughout experience; causality is the expression of the creative activity, the initiating power of the human mind in its self-determining capacities. Impersonalism cannot construe the relations between permanence and change; personalism finds these in the abiding nature of the self in its manifold experiences.

These epistemeological and metaphysical objections may be urged against all anti-theistic theories, Positivism, Agnosticism, Materialism, Pantheism, as far as they involve accounts of the nature of ultimate reality. This Positivism resolutely refuses to do. Of its strange religion of humanity as proposed by Comte we need not speak. The deep demands of practical life, closely related to theory, have passed judgment upon it, and it has duly found its place in the museum of religious curiosities. It professes to know of nothing save of phenomena and their laws that "describe the constant resemblances that link phenomena together and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent", covered by the general term science. But Comte, its chief representative, finds it entirely impossible to avoid metaphysical questions. Phenomena are appearances of something to somebody; they are not affirmable as such without epistemological assumptions

of which Comte never thinks; and, as affirmable, have implications the existence of which he never suspects. Law, as we have seen, is a term that implies much, and is impossible of rational understanding save by that introspective knowledge, now dignified as the science of Pschology, whose practicability Comte would not allow. But where otherwise do we get the notions of simultaneity and sequence, than from consciousness and its activities? The question whether mind is necessary in its action or freely directs itself he never answered, because he never truly understood the problem of knowledge: he assumed the validity of knowledge in a naive realism long since discredited. Positivism must of necessity adopt the test of consistency as the only test of truth, and still refuses to accept its primary implication, a consistent universe, at bottom honest, open to scrutiny, and thus subject to valid knowledge.

Like Positivism, Agnosticism, of which Herbert Spencer is the chief representative, assumes a naive realism which overlooks all epistemological problems and their implications. It never asks how the mind gets its knowledge, and what are the conclusions that must be drawn from its nature and activity. Instead, moreover, of observing a neutral attitude toward the question of theism, which a presumable ignorance calls for, it concludes that ultimate reality is 'unknowable'; but in the attempt manifests what John Stuart Mill calls prodigious amount of knowledge concerning the Unknowable. Prof. E.C. Sheldon in his "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century" (p.101) thus sums up the foundations of Spencer's Agnosticism: "The grounds of Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable are derived in large part from the speculations of Hamilton and Mansel. Appeal is made to Hamilton's doctrine that to think means to condition, and that consequently the unconditioned, whether infinitely great or infinitely little, lies entirely beyond the sphere of thought. The like doctrine is cited from Mansel, and the same sceptical believer is drawn upon for the demonstration that the absolute and infinite, as having a possible existence out of all relations, cannot be consistently regarded as a cause, or a self-conscious subject, or indeed as the bearer of any intelligible predicate. To considerations of this order Spencer adds the assumption that knowledge always subsists in and through the classification of its objects, and that the ultimate reality, as being incapable of assignment to a class, is plainly Unknowable."

But as Prof. Sheldon likewise points out, to think does not mean to limit; it may indicate the absence of all limitations, as to enumerate the attributes of the infinite may be but to exhibit from every possible point of view that the object of thought is unconditioned. So with Dean Mansel's definition of the absolute as not involved in relations. Such an absolute would not be affirmable. But its relations are not to be conceived of as necessary but as freely-chosen and self-imposed. All that is needed is independent and self-sufficient being, accounting for all things adequately; but certainly what is needed is not a vacuum. Interior distinctions, illustrated by the variety in unity, characteristic of our highest known existence, may only exhibit its surpassing richness. Moreover, the absolute as unique is not possible of classification. Things may be defined through contrast as well as similarity; as similar, in that they are represented by the highest categories; as contrasted, in that they possess these in infinite measure. While formally denying all this, Spencer is compelled actually to make large admissions. Phenomena as manifestations must be in relation to the unknowable; and it, to be of use to him, must be one, must be power, must be infinite, must be eternal, and must be creative in the sense that from it all things proceed. Indeed, as Bradley points out, the mere adoption of consistency as a test vacates Agnosticism. The postulate that reality is consistent, while apparently meaning little, we have already seen to mean much.

Though repudiating the charge of materialism, Spencer's philosophy has more affiliation here than anywhere else. He relies upon matter in its arrangment and movement to account for the universe, inorganic and organic, unconscious and conscious. But the cause is not adequate to the effect, and Spencer's showy formula of evolution upon examination fails to yield results. The doctrine of the conservation of energy, as Ward points out, is not an axiom but an induction, whose all-inclusive range depends upon the finite nature of the world. The doctrine of the instability of the homogeneous is a contradiction in terms and a gainsaying of experience. Absolute homogeneity means absolute stability, a changeless condition unless moved upon from the outside, which, when the homogeneous is all-comprehensive, does not exist. "Evolution", he says, "is an integration of matter and a concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent

homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation" (First Principles, par.145). But the mere arrangement of material molecules, their rapid or slow motion, lends no insight into the passage from the inorganic to the organic, or from life to mind. As Prof. Royce summarizes the matter: "The requirement of the situation is not that the philosopher should tell us (truly enough) that evolution involves both shrinkings and swellings, both mixings and sortings, both variety and order, but that he should show us how these various tendencies are, in the various types of evolutionary process, kept in that peculiar balance, which each time constitutes an evolution. This is what Spencer seems not to have done." (Royce, Herbert Spencer, An Estimate and a Review p. 114,115. Quoted by Sheldon, Unbelief etc. p. 117)

Spencer's failure to lend insight to the passage from the inorganic to the organic he admits in his reference with ludicrous effect to two missing volumes of the Synthetic Philosophy, those on Inorganic Evolution. "The closing chapters of the second of these volumes," he says, "were it written, would deal with the evolution of organic matter, the step preceding the evolution of living forms. Habitually carrying with me in thought the contents of this unwritten chapter, I have in some cases, expressed myself as though the reader had it before him; and have thus rendered some of my statements liable to misconstruction." (Principles of Biology sterotyped ed. vol. I p. 480) His further failure to make the transition from life to consciousness, needs in the same way no comment except his own words describing the supposed beginnings of consciousness. "Those abilities which an intelligent creature possesses, of recognizing diverse external objects and of adjusting its actions to composite phenomena of various kinds, imply a power of combining many separate impressions. These separate impressions are received by the senses-- by different parts of the body. If they go no further than the places at which they are received, they are useless.--------- That an effectual adjustment may be made they must all be brought into relation with one another. But this implies some center common to them all through which they can pass; and as they cannot pass through it simultaneously they must pass through it in succession, so that as the external phenomena responded to become greater in number and more complicated in kind, the variety and rapidity of the changes in which this common center of

communication is subject must increase- there must result an unbroken series of these changes there must arise a consciousness."

Much, the same, speculative difficulties, holding against materialism we may urge against pantheism. While materialism makes matter all that is essential, and mind but its effect, pantheism makes both the coordinate expressions of a unitary being. But both make change the result of necessary evolution, and find no God outside the physical universe other than as coming to expression in finite consciousness. Pantheism will not ascribe personality to the Infinite. All the speculative objections, therefore, against necessitarianism may be urged against pantheism, and all the felt speculative need for personalism also.

The relation between the theoretical and the practical is abundantly illustrated in the foregoing discussion of theistic doctrine by the disproportionate stress placed upon the doctrine of the personality of God. At equal length we could speak of other attributes; but personalism absorbs attention because around it controversy has most largely centered. Take for granted honest and consistent personality back of the universe, and much follows without lengthy debate. Immutability naturally follows from this; spirituality- if anything more than is implied by personality- from the insufficiency of matter; unity may be predicated from interaction; omnipotence admitted, though a finite world, however extended, only hints at, but does not demand, an infinite God, and though free will imposes temporary limitations on his ultimate purposes; eternity is presupposed by the transcendental nature of the First Cause, out of the causal nexus as the precondition of interaction, and by the ideal nature of time; omniscence from His personality and range of His power; righteousness and love from the testimony of our admittedly highest nature, which could not be as it is unless these qualities were also attributes of the Divine personality. On these attributes of God, therefore, abundently treated in works on Christian doctrine, we need place no further special stress. One, however, must engage our attention, as illustrating the practical nature of the considerations that sway even the most theoretically consistent, the limitations necessitated by our mental constitutions, and the deepening mystery that surrounds all the fundamental problems of our lives. It is the attribute of omniscience. The Arminian or Catholic view of omniscience makes it an intuitive knowledge that transcends the temporal

order and does not reason from cause to effect, but takes in all reality past, present, and future in one indivisible grasp. This does not necessitate what is commonly known as the scientia media, God's foreknowledge of events under any supposable conditions. Calvinism, as involving necessity and cancelling free choice, finds no difficulties with foreknowledge since God is assumed to reason from cause to effect. But any form of all inclusive determinism, as we have noted, also cancels the validity of thought and moral responsibility; and must therefore be rejected both on theoretical and practical grounds. The third view, that of Socinus, favored also by Rothe, Martensen, and L. D. McCabe, affirms the proper contingency of the acts of free-will, and excludes foreknowledge as not essential to the idea of omniscience, just as the performance of contradictions is not essential to the idea of omnipotence. The moral reason given by this view against the Catholic attitude that foreknowledge impugns the divine benevolence and justice in that God creates individual beings whom He forsees will be eternally miserable does not seem to be well taken. For if he has forseen them as eternally miserable, it has been only as he has seen them first created, and then freely choosing a life leading to eternal misery. The objection that we cannot construe thorough-going timelessness may also be dismissed; since it both involves less difficulty than any theory of the reality of time; and since also, while we are temporally constituted and our experiences come in succession, a single mental experience, involving one pulse of the mental life and including in one grasp manifold logical relations, is of a timeless nature. While we cannot construe the relation of the timeless to the temporal as implying succession, practical experience furnishes an intermixture of the two between which we are constantly oscillating; so that insight into the possibility of the relation is at least given. But granting the elimination of all temporal elements from experience, as far as with temporally endowed natures we can think of such a condition' I, for one, can affirm no insight into the possibility, not in temporal phrase of 'foreknowing what will be, when it possibly will not be', but in untemporal phrase 'knowing what may be,' when freewill concedes that it possibly 'may not be'.

Let it be noted that this does not affirm an absolute divine nescience, but a nescience only of properly contingent acts, and not of determined acts, which even the stoutest Arminian will concede form a large part of human life, in which evil acts are many times determined

by evil character, as good acts in part are determined also by good character. A practical situation such as we now describe is quite possible. Within certain spheres, fixed by definite limits of influence, God may allow the operations of the free-will of individuals, the exact results of which He is ignorant until determined or performed in accord with the conditions of His own self-limitation. Within that sphere He allows each free creature to make his free choices and mold his character, creating a reality which is genuine enough, but depending on God's permission, and which might have been otherwise. But in the nature of the case, the influence of such reality is not allowed to flow beyond the fixed limits of its definite field, and so cannot affect the final results of God's great plan, coordinating a countless multitude of such spheres to the great purposes which in holy love He contemplates. "And Thou hast appointed his bounds that he cannot pass." Indeed in this view, nothing prevents, save previous self-limitation, from interposing in any sphere, guiding, where He can, without transgressing such self-limitation, the free-elements involved, the good against the evil, and so altering the nature of the final outcome even within the compass of a single sphere. Thus He could make the wrath of men to praise him and restrain the rest.

Such a situation meets the two primary practical objections against the doctrine of an unqualified divine nescience and has practical advantages of its own. It does not present God as "dwelling largely in the dark" and "incapable of forcasting the outcome of the schemes which He has initiated." The outcome in His mind is quite clear. He is by no means in the dark, save as in the nature of the conditions of a voluntarily chosen experiment, somewhat of twighlight is temporarily necessitated. While details have not been fixed, the general outcome is sure and known as any certainty may be known. God is still omniscient: He knows all that there is to know; but He does not know what is not and what may not be. Such a theory, moreover, coheres with all the scriptural data, which cannot be pressed into unequivocally affirming foreknowledge of strictly contingent events.

Finally we may say that this theory has certain practical advantages. It affirms in a striking way, that affords insight, that while a single man's cooperation with God will not necessarily make the final outcome different in kind, it may make it different in degree.

The sum total of reality will be good anyway, but it will be better if he does his part, and does it to the best of his ability. Should he refuse, while he does not change the general result, he advertizes his own attitude as rebellious and recalcitrant, and in a real way, limits the sum total of the good, even if he does not destroy its quality. In conclusion it should be stressed that of course no measure of absolute necessity exists in support of this theory. It merely attempts to avoid what to us, limited by temporal natures, must remain either an inconsistency or a profound mystery. For the strongest advocates of the foreknowledge of strictly contingent events admit that the doctrine involves the deepest mystery (cf. H. C. Sheldon; History of Christian Doctrine, 2:310). Our suggestion continues to maintain the omniscience of God; and adds genuine incentive to our creative activities. Where rational considerations do not urge or compel, where the Scriptural data are not cogent, we seek an explanation that from the human point of view is consistent. If any others feel compelled to affirm the existence of a mystery in this connection, we can only reply that to us both our data and consistency, our general criterion, does not seem to demand such affirmation.

Even in this theoretical discussion of belief in God that has preceded, the close relation of the theoretical and the practical, that, save by abstraction, cannot be broken, has already been illustrated. In the argument from the nature of moral effect to the nature of the moral cause, it is again strikingly emphasized. We can conceive of those who have so transgressed against their best natures, so violated their highest moral judgments and noblest impulses, so suppressed the natural tendencies to affection and obligations to love, that, having eliminated them from their own lives, and become sceptical of their existence in the lives of others they no longer feel the necessity of postulating a cause for them. To such the world is consistent enough, but consistently evil. This outcome, however, is the result of an insincere, and, therefore, inconsistent, response to the demands for consistent conduct, and its individually subjective nature is made clear by the absence of those universal and abiding effects that flow from genuine self-committal to a personal God as we have tried to present Him.

These are revealed in the practical test of this fundamental belief in God made in

accord with our pragmatic definition of consistency which proceeds on the basis that theory and practice must be closely related. We point out, however, before going further, that before being practically tested, a theory must have some claim to theoretical consistency, and so be regarded as antecedently true. Only thus will it work as it sets out to work. Indeed, false theories may be made to work for a time, but, insofar as they are false, they antagonize abiding elements in human nature and in the physical universe. At the same time also, a true theory may not work for a time, because not believed in as true. To give it practical efficiency what may be needed is a deeper demonstration of its theoretical truth. This is often so with faith in God. Belief in God, followed by a consistent self-committal to Him, is the only one that offers the deepest incentive to the operation of our mental processes, to the activities of moral living, and alone affords hope of a desirable future. Thinking is not a commodity of which we have had too much in the world, and fundamentally consistent thinking is at a premium, a worthful product, the results of which humanity eagerly siezes. To continue it unremittingly requires a gathering together of the ripest powers of man, the concentration of these to one end, and toilsome application that tells on convenience and health, that calls for large sacrifices of money, time, and energy. Despite all the large material and social rewards that follow careful thought great proportions of mankind cannot be induced to do much thinking. What then would be the case were its validity cut away from underneath? But with appeal to chance both the universality and necessity of thought, and, with them true consistency, must be abandoned; and, with appeal to determinism, would come the paralysis of all mental initiative. In personalism we have the only guarantee that our thoughts are of any worth, and the incentive to continue what must ever be an arduous duty to the most eagerly inclined. When, however, mental processes are looked upon as the self-poised and free activities of the human mind, made possible by the self-poised and free activity of the Divine mind, and when thought that is finally sifted and tested, is understood to be valid and therefore supremely worthful to man, then however difficult the labor and arduous the task, it will be continued and completed. That those without theistic faith have persisted in such work throughout past ages may be attributed not only to instinct, desire, and immediate practical return, but also to an oversight of

the implications of atheism. Atheistic ideas have not "worked" as they "set out to work". So strong has been the consistency of the working universe, that it has overpowered the inconsistency of many minds; and so brought about a theoretically inconsistent, but practically and happily consistent, result. But, however happily impersonalism may operate for a time, in the long run it makes for falsehood and intellectual apathy.

In many way's the difficulties of high moral living are greater than the obstacles to active and constant thinking. Only as we understand men to be our brethren, because we are children of a common heavenly Father, do we find adequate incentive to guard their rights and grant them their proper privileges. No one respects highly the rights and privileges of an automatom. Without theism, moreover, there can be no rational basis for the fundamental ethical intuitions; either for the first as expressed by Kant's great moral maxim or by the Golden Rule, or for the second that calls for universal altruism. On examination, impersonal law, as we have noted, is seen to be a contradiction in terms. Personalism alone gives proper guarantee of consequences in penalty or reward. Individuals may for a time, or in rare cases, all their lives, acquit themsleves well toward their fellows on other than theistic presuppositions. In such cases early Christian training and example are large factors in their conduct. But in the long run theism has alone furnished appropriate stimulus to the highest morality.

This is especially so since theistic foundations alone furnish the aid to morality commonly afforded by religion. Agnosticism and positivism offer no proper objects for the religious sense; humanity in the abstract excites no more reverence than humanity in the concrete. Materialism presents nothing to worship but a vast machine, with its most attractive features robbed of their highest significance. Pantheism, though it speaks of God in theistic terms, finds him coming to highest consciousness in human beings; and while not thus elevating man, it degrades God; for while man is made no different in the change of conception, God in his proper sense in gone.

It excites no surprise, then, that theism alone holds out hope for the future; and that when it is denied pessimism soon emerges. As a theoretical explanation of the world we have

not given pessimism, as represented by Schopenhauer, its chief exponent, any place at all. In making the ultimate reality blind impersonal, aberrant will it lays itself open to many of the strictures against materialism and pantheism. In its theoretical details it is full of inconsistencies, which begin with the notion of impersonal will, a vicious abstraction that finds no basis in experience. In experiences, will is never manifest save in connection with self-consciousness. The best end that pessimism can offer to man, afflicted with unsatisfied will, relieved only here and there by interest in music and the arts, is annihilation. Such an attitude of despair, as throwing consistency to the winds, is more the result of a mood than of reason. As a mood, it cannot be refuted by argument; it is the negation of trust and can be removed only by the creation of a fundamental faith. The moment even faith in consistency as a test is possible, the human mind tends to cry with Bradley, "Where everything is bad, it must be good to know the worst" and "Where all is rotten, it is a man's work to stinking fish." Even in suicide, the consistent outcome of a genuine pessimism, a type of faith, though of low degree is noticeable. For the victim of his own theoretical or practical despair, must still believe, and commit himself to his belief, that the pistol, or dagger, or poison will operate with accustomed uniformity, and his system respond with all due regularity. Theism, as a consistent explanation of the universe, affords appropriate foundation for optimism; and Christianity, with what it adds to theism, finds genuine reason and some comfort even in misery and suffering. It calls upon men to fight evil everywhere; but where evil imposes itself from without, it gives strength to endure by its doctrine of an overruling Providence, cooperating with every true and earnest effort to break the power of dishonesty and injustice, hate and cruelty. While it absolves God from complicity with evil, it tells of the possibility of developing long-suffering and stable character, whose sincerity has been tested by adversity, and cannot now be accused of a low self-interest. That Being, Who does not allow man's freedom to exercise itself beyond fixed bounds, and Whose sovereignity makes possible an unseen direction of concrete situations, too complicated to be comprehended, by man's narrow vision, and too hopeless of solution by man's limited power, is ever in Divine wisdom and omnipotence unweariedly bringing light out of darkness and truth from error and good from evil. To individuals whose lives, from an earthly point

of view, end in despair, as the temporary victims of malevolence and injustice, theism holds out the possibility of another life where readjustment shall be made in response to that moral sense of mankind, which, in its assumption of an honest universe, underlies the test of consistency, and exerts as imperious a demand for its satisfaction as the intellectual nature of mankind calls for truth. We turn our attention, then, to the strictly Christian elements in a system we are striving to represent as consistent.

2. Essential Facts of Revelation.

The probability of special Divine revelation founds itself on the nature of the Divine person. From the preceding discussion it might be inferred that no other revelation is necessary than that offered by the physical universe and human nature. With personalistic conclusions postulated all phenomena, including human nature, are manifestations of somebody to somebody. But let it be remembered that discussions like the above are possible only through the intellectual inheritance of ages, and training that is given to few, aided by the additional insight afforded by Christian presuppositions and life. Without such training, few could follow, much less conduct, such an argument; and all like to find confirmation in experience with the concrete events of the world's life. The further test of seeing how theories work is in accord with the pragmatic mode of defining consistency. But to have conditions of such experiment at their best there is need of that vital faith in God that increases the hunger for ultimate truth and sharpens and cleanses the instruments of knowledge. The method we have adopted is the logical method of approach to the religious life, but it is not the usual one. For the mass of mankind a simpler and more direct method of revealing the truth concerning God and mankind seems necessary; a revelation that not only brings light but warmth: one that not only illumines the intellect, but arouses the feelings, and puts pressure upon the will. It would be contrary to the nature of the Divine Father, vitally interested in bringing to successful issue a kingdom of righteousness, to deny to men,- indifferent to truth, under ordinary circumstances, morally impervious, and with inefficient instruments of knowledge,- the help that comes through a unique method of revelation.

Difficulties with such revelation have usually arisen from pre-conceptions as to the nature of the method rather than with the antecedent probability of the fact. Some would take as the revelation what is merely the record of revelation; and so call for a theory of verbal inspiration. Some so distrust the operation of human faculties that they demand infallibility. Some so far forget the progressive nature of the life of the race and the necessary limitations of men incidental to this, that they demand a parity of authority for all parts of revelation, and a scientific background for these parts in all senses agreeing with the modern. But the scholarship of the world will no longer allow that these claims are theoretically consistent, so that, where they are still made among the intelligent as essentials of Christianity, the Scriptures have lost some of their practical influence. It is worth commenting on the fact that it is their practical influence in the past that, has made them a storm-center; and, should that practical influence ever cease, all that has been written about them would tend to become so much intellectual lumber, and they themselves but historical and literary curiosities for the academically inclined. Only as they commend themselves to both the thought and life of the race, as worthy of the nature of that God, insight into Those being and character has already been reached in some sense independent of them, shall they be continued as on the plane of special revelation.

The intrinsic necessities of the case require that to have commended the intellectual respect of the times in which it was first mediated, and so gained a hearing for its moral and spiritual messages, a special revelation must have been clothed in the scientific conceptions of its own day. As pedagogically adapted to the moral and spiritual development of its readers, it necessarily included elements, imperfect from the ideal point of view, but preparing the way for fulness of revelation. Unless, moreover, we postulate an infinitely magic in which the normal mental and spiritual processes were entirely superseded, in so far as the mediums of revelation were intellectually and morally imperfect, its fulness would be limited. Granting the operation of such magic, the difficulties would not cease; since with return to the normal state, the means of insight into their outlook, and the power for laying them upon the hearts of others would be gone. Insofar also, as the mediums of revelation were morally and intellectually perfect, it would be a final revelation as adapted to

the moral and spiritual necessities of mankind. An examination of this collection of books, commonly called the Holy Scriptures, seems to reveal the presence of those needed elements, culminating in the revelation made by that most unique character, Jesus of Nazareth.

Fairly to consider the evidence brought by his unparalleled life and consciousness, we must be able to believe in the historical nature of the records which make them accessible to us. Again we note that it is because of the potency of the practical influence of Jesus that the largest part of the most vigorous Biblical controversy has centered around the genuineness and authenticity of the four gospels. The kind of evidence that would make clear the authorship and historical nature of the gospels is of the same kind that will demonstrate the authorship and historicity of any ancient writing. On account of the much wider influence of the gospels, however, and the tremendous practical issues at stake, the discussion centering about them has been fiercer and more prolonged than that about any other ancient works. Around the points at issue a vast critical literature has grown, striving to establish or demolish two conclusions: first, that the gospels were regarded as genuine and authentic by contemporaries and did not materially alter during later generations; and secondly,--- what is in part a corrollary from the first proposition,--- the efforts of some critics to disprove their genuineness and historicity has failed. If the gospels were received by contemporaries of their authors as genuine and authentic we should expect little question of these matters, until a slightly later period, and then only in an incidental way, taking these items partially for granted,

This is precicely what we do find. Irenaeus, born about 130 A.D., Bishop of the Church of Lyons in Asia Minor from A.D. 178-202, in defending Christianity against the Gnostics, assumes the historicity and authority of the Gospels and quotes copiously from them. He outlines the testimony of Papias, Bishop of Hierapolis, whom he describes as a man of the old time, a contemporary of Polycarp (A.D. 69-155) who knew the daughters of Phillip, either the apostle or the evangelist, and who had been a disciple of John the Apostle. According to Papias, John related that Mark had written the sayings and doings of Jesus as the "interpreter" of Peter, that "Matthew wrote the oracles (logia) in the Hebrew tongue, and everyone interpreted them as he could." As Papias was dealing merely with the

sayings of Jesus in his book the Exposition [illegible] not [illegible] all of the present Gospel of Matthew to the same authorship, especially as to does not speak of a second author as the writer of the whole. In the same way Marcion, who came from Asia Minor to Rome, A. D. 140, while rejecting the first two Gospels as tainted with Jewish error, [illegible] the [illegible] and historicity of Luke as universally acknowledged and historically unimpeachable. So Clement of Alexandria, born at Athens not later than A. D. 160, [illegible] the authenticity of the four gospels; and there follows him in this conclusion Tertullian of North Africa (A. D. 160); the Muratorian fragment of Roman origin, written about A. D. 170; the Peshito, the Bible of ancient Syrian Christianity, collected about the same time; and so finally, also, Justin Martyr, writing two apologies about A. D. 152, draws from the life and teachings of Jesus, as continued in what he styles the Memoirs, which must be identified with the Gospels. His references to Jesus, when arranged chronologically, form a complete life of Jesus, tallying with the account given in the four gospels, and with but scanty differences to be accounted for by the incorporation or oral traditions not alluded to in the gospels.

It is a matter of real significance that the authorship of the Fourth Gospel, as genuinely John's, was not radically questioned until 1844 by Baur. Almost unchallenged acceptation had marked its existence from the earliest centuries. Then with Baur began that departure from the orthodox position, including the work of Strauss and Renan which ends in Keim with a movement back to the Catholic position. The first three of these critics began their work with pantheistic and naturalistic presuppositions, antagonistic to theism and miracles. In the case of Strauss and Baur, Hegel's influence was most marked. Renan was not profound enough philosophically to have a well-defined world view, but appropriated from Kant, Hamilton, Comte, and Hegel. All scouted the personality of God and the possibility of miracles. Necessarily they had to eliminate them from the gospel narratives.

Strauss accomplished this by postulating a myth-making tendency; Baur, if at all, attempted to explain the records of the miracles by means of psychological law which, he affirms, in the case of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel, makes possible its authors sincere belief in the fictitious work of his imagination, trying to establish an identity

between the Gnostic logos and the historic Jesus; and Renan finally, was driven to the theory of deliberate imposture. They all notice the differences between the Synoptic gospels and John's; and with naturalistic premises that will not allow of miracles, lay emphasis on detailed discrepancies that can be accounted for as easily as are the differences in detail of most competent witnesses in the court-room, and the assumption of points of view and purposes on the part of its author that still stand in need of confirmation, they conclude that not John, but someone else was the author of the Fourth Gospel. But the supposed data and inferences that follow are mutually destructive, and lead Keim, in meeting the difficulty, provided by need of a data of authorship as early as 98 A.D., to dispense with the universally received tradition that John the Apostle resided at Ephesus during his last years. Into the details of criticism we cannot go in this paper. We must content ourselves with pointing out that none of these critics do justice to the unique personality, life, and influence of Jesus as described by Keim himself and summarized by H.C. Sheldon in his "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century" p. 320-322. "Though denying the supernatural conception and the pre-existence of Jesus, and defining him in essence as purely human, Keim hardly stops short of a worshipful eulogy in the tribute which he pays to him. He accepts the facts of his sinlessness, and declares that this by himself puts him above the category of the mere religious genius. Any small infirmities, he says, which may be thought to have been manifested by Jesus, were not real sins, but only natural incidents of the human constitution in Jesus, and of the historic l situation. As regards the hidden life of his earlier years, we can reason back to its exemption from the stain of transgression. The one who in his sinless manhood felt no smart over his past record must have been distinguished by a blameless youth. And in respect of positive endowments Jesus stands equally above the ordinary level. In the characteristics of his inner life and in his historical signigicance he is without parallel. He represents a new stage in the development of the human spirit. In his person a divine miracle (Das Wunder Gottes) is disclosed. The spirit of sonship comes to perfection in him, and he had in full measure that sense of human dignity and of divine love which exists in others in marred and fragmentary form. He stands for a new creation in humanity, a completion of the divine image. He is the divine man in whom the stirring of God after complete manifestation and the restless struggle of man to

grasp God came to a satisfying result. He exemplifies the highest attainable stage of the inner union of God and man, and one is merely giving place to an unworthy and impertinent dream when he supposes it possible for another to surpass Jesus in achievement and personality. In his transcendence of the conditions of his time and the characteristics of his contemporaries, he makes the impression of a mysterious uniqueness, a superhuman marvel, a divine creation. To view his person is to view not merely a work among many works of God, but the most peculiar work, the specific revelation of God. In harmony with his extraordinary standing He attributes, even in the face of seeming downfall, eternal validity to his own personal cause. He is the basis of rest and the spring of motion in the world, the creator of a new, higher cosmos whose days are reckoned by milleniums. Even his opponents, in so far as they strive for the worthy, are compelled to fight under the banner of the man who, after the fashion of God, called out of nothingness, as no other beside him has done, a world of life."

In accord with this estimate we have a miracle, as remarkable as any to be conceived of in the physical world. On a theistic basis, which we must postulate, if our previous discussion is of any worth, involving divine self-consciousness. self-direction, and immanent working, what we call the natural is but a description of God's uniform and regular working; and what we call the miraculous, His departure from such uniformity; but both root back in the Divine purpose, will, and power; and neither more so than the other. If Divine purpose demand, nothing can prevent the miracle; and it is not therefore a priori incredible. As the miraculous in the physical world, just as in the case of the natural, finds adequate explanation only in personalism, so the miraculous in human experience, with the self-consciousness, the external life, and the subsequent influence of Jesus, can find consistent explanation in theism alone.

Granting the genuineness of the gospels, the testimony of the evangelists concerning the nature of the self-consciousness of Jesus, as well as of his life and more objective teaching, is in itself evidence of their authenticity. His self-consciousness is absolutely unique, and its invention more marvellous than the fact itself. Moreover, it is not something extrinsic and adventitious, but self-providing, and lends to the gospels their peculiar

unity. For their testimony the disciples underwent extreme suffering and even death: this is evidence of their sincerity. In sober colors, free from the exaggrations of later Apocrypha, which stand in great contrast, they tell of the wonders of their Master's life. For believers in theism, these are not a priori incredible, and coupled with His personality, so unique as to be miraculous, they are altogether appropriate and quite congruos. The hypothesis of delusion is impossible in the face of the objective character of the narratives, which lay emphases upon the limitations and human weaknesses of Jesus. We note nothing resembling rhapsodic deification of their Master in their discription of His agony in the Garden. The impression of this objective nature of their story is increased as they tell of their own weaknesses, their slowness, and their dullness in appreciating the meaning of His teaching, their misunderstanding of the spiritual nature of the Kingdom, their worldly horror at the thought of Jesus crucifixion, their ambitious rivalries, the denial of Peter, the desertion of all at Christ's arrest, and finally their utter hopelessness at the time of the resurrection. What could give greater impression of the factual nature of their report than these items? Never did they forget their peculiar functions as witnesses to which Jesus had called them, and which they were constantly under obligation to fulfill. Linking this with the impressions always made by remarkable personalities upon their fellows and the lasting memories made even by the smallest details, we must affirm deliberate fraud or real authenticity.

A glance at the unique self-consciousness of Jesus in its transcendent phases, totally different from anything ever witnessed to by any other human personality, however exalted his station or nature, lends the impression of direct divine insight and authority to the revelation he came to bring. This peculiar self-consciousness manifested ifself in the claims He made on humanity in general and on His disciples in particular, in His assumption of Divine attributes such as pre-existence, omnipresence, and ommipotence, and finally to such a dignity that, if we regard expressions of its nature as true we are compelled to raise Him to the category of Deity. His demands upon humanity to follow Him were most imperative and unqualified. He told men that, if they loved father and mother, sister and brother, houses and lands more than him, they were not worthy of Him. He was absolute in His sway

over His disciples. "Why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say. Ye are my friends if ye do whatsoever I command you." He ordered His disciples to go into all the world and preach the gospel knowing that they would go as lambs in the midst of wolves, but with the promise that He would draw all men unto Himself. He instituted the sacrament of the Lord's supper, saying, "Do this in remembrance of me."

As no other man that has ever lived, and had respect paid to his profession, He laid claim to direct and conscious insight into His pre-existent state. "And no man hath ascended up to heaven but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven. This was often done in a most incidental way that reveals the natural mode and the unforced expression of such consciousness. "What and if ye shall see the Son of Man ascend up where he was before?" Again in teaching the Jews he remarks, "Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my days: and, he saw it and was glad. Then said the Jews unto Him, "Thou art not fifty years old and hast thou seen Abraham? Jesus said unto them verily, verily, I say unto you. Before Abraham was I am. '" In the great prayer at the close of His life he asks, "And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was."

In all this, moreover, there is no apologetic attempt at an abstract presentation of such attributes, natural to Deity alone, as characterizing His own person. From the midst of a concrete situation, His personality, apparently restricted by human limitations, is constantly pressing. We notice this in connection with statements concerning His omnipresence. Conjoined with the authoritative demand to preach to all nations is the sure promise following it as a condition, "And lo, I am with you always even unto the end of the world." Connected with the promise of answers to prayer is the statement of His presence even with a small group gathered in His spirit. "Where two or three are gathered together in my name there am I in the midst." In the same way in maintaining to Nicodemus the range and authority of His message and the intuitive insight on which it was based He couples his transcendents of the usual spacial limitations with the statement of His pre-existence, "No man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that cometh down from heaven, even the Son of Man which is in heaven."

Apart from the miracles of physical healing and material change performed by Jesus in common with others who did their work in the name and power of God, the self-consciousness of Jesus witnessed to a sense of power and authority utterly transcending theirs. So Matthew records Him as saying after His resurrection, "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth." John testifies with even greater elaborateness to the nature of this self-consciousness; "As the Father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them: even so the Son quickeneth whom He will.-------Verily, verily, I say unto you the hour cometh and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live. For as the Father hath life in himself even so he gave him authority to execute judgment, because he is the son of man. Marvel not at this: for the hour cometh when all that are in the tombs shall hear his voice and shall come forth. -------Therefore doth my Father love me because I lay down my life that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down and I have power to take it again." Such was His control not only over His own destiny, but the ultimate destiny of others that He could conclude of them, "I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand." It was in accord with this attitude of final authority that He used the words of the great high-priestly prayer, "Father the hour is come; glorify thy Son that thy Son may also glorify thee: as thou hast given him power over all flesh that he should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him. It was entirely congruous with such self-consciousness, moreover, not merely that Christ should perform miracles, with an attitude at times wholly different from prophetic predecessors; but that in His own name and authority He should forgive men their sins. Such action the religious leaders of his time rightly interpreted as indication of His assumption of Divine equality with the Father, and, not willing to accord Him this position, they ranked Him as a blasphemer.

The attributes we have mentioned are in entire accord with the attitude He took toward His personal preeminence. Without a sense of the sanity and sobriety which the world has ever ascribed to Him, this attitude would reveal an egotism bordering on insanity. But meekness, humility, and self-restraint, joined with the most marvellous sense of personal

worth and superhuman dignity, was one of the chief marks of Jesus. With one wave of His hand He brushed aside the non-essentials of the Mosaic law, details over which learned rabbis had quibbled for centuries. Moses the great law-giver had said thus and so, but He, One, incomparably greater, struck a fundamentally deeper note. He was Lord of the Sabbath, Israel's most important religious institution, and He proposed to readjust it to man's deepest needs even in the face of the most violent opposition. Moreover, not merely did He, who had been trained in reverence for God in a devout Jewish home and constantly inculcated it in others, permit worship of Himself, but He enjoined it. When Thomas cried, "My Lord and my God," there was no rebuke forthcoming from Him. On the contrary His attitude on this point may be summed up in His own words as follows: "The Father hath committed all judgment unto the Son that all men should honor the Son even as they honor the Father. He that honoreth not the Son honoreth not the Father which sent Him." It was this claim to deity that helped to arouse the worst nature of the Pharisees against Him and in the light of which His words, "I and the Father are One" must be construed. It is true that, divorced from His life, teaching, and unique self-consciousness, they may postulate ethical unity only. But with these in our thought as the Jews had them in their thought, our conclusion must be like theirs. John dramatically represents the whole situation, as on these words of Jesus, each of the Jews grasped a stone with which to kill Him for arrogating to Himself the place of Deity. "Many good works have I shewed you from the Father," cried Jesus, "for which of those works do ye stone Me?" The Jews answered and said, "For a good work we stone thee not, but for blasphemy, because thou being a man, makest thyself God."

We have dwelt at this length on the unique self-consciousness of Jesus, since His conception of His transcendent nature is of even greater importance than the sinless perfections of His human nature, emphasized by men like Keim, in validating the New Testament as a revelation from God to man. Still, the two may be said mutually to support each other: the holiness and sanity of His human nature lend credibility to His report of His divine nature; and His Divine nature provides a background making for credibility in those perfections of His human nature, which are rather supported than in all cases detailed. Such self-consciousness, moreover, is, as we have said, the out-standing miracle, a greater marvel than

any physical wonder, and like all miracles to be accounted for only on personalistic grounds. The memory of the expressions of His self-consciousness, furthermore, remained with His disciples to the end, and led to their further attempts at Christological construction in the epistolary literature of the New Testament. But while they evidently postulated the union of the human and the Divine within the compass of His personality, it remained for later generations to attempt an insight into the possibility of this union. The practical power of Christianity has largely depended upon belief in it, as well as in the Scriptures as revelation, and loss of practical power may largely be attributed to loss of belief here. Here again we note the intimate relation of the theoretical and the practical. In time, loss of practical power means further loss of theoretical belief, as Christianity tends to fail in that vital influence necessary to stimulate to the study of her doctrines.

That, then, can be said in all consistency on the subject of the incarnation as it relates to the subject of the union of the human and divine in Christ. A satisfactory theory must take into consideration both historical evidence and philosophical conceptions of the nature of personality and the essential attributes of the human and the divine: Prof. H. C. Sheldon, having already discussed the subject of the Trinity, to which we shall come in a moment, after an eminently candid and fair canvass of the data, thus summarizes the results: (System of Christian Doctrine p, 358) "(1) Having postulated a finite human nature in Christ we are not permitted in good logic to take this out of the plane of finitude and represent it as a bearer of Divine or infinite attributes. (2) Having represented the Son of God as truly Divine, and therefore as possessed of the attributes which are proper to a necessary and immutable being, we cannot with rational consistency suppose those attributes to be laid aside or suppressed so that their original subject may descend to the conditions of the growing, the contingent, and the mutable. (3) Having assumed that a Trinitarian life is an essential mode of the God-head, we cannot consistently suppose one of the Divine Persons to undergo a metamorphosis which logically involves His recession from the Trinity or a reduced function therein. (4) While theology accepts the fact of a unique and incomparable union of the human and the Divine in Christ, it has no means of clear insight into the mode of the union, it can reach at best only an approximate application, and accordingly cannot properly

stamp as dogma any hard and fast theory on the subject. At the close of all constructive effort in relation to Christiology the discreet thinker will be inclined to recall the remark of one of the early fathers that the mystery of Christ's person is beyond human grasp, and very likely also 'beyond the grasp of the entire creation of celestial powers.' As a formal Christological definition Prof. Sheldon submits the following: "In Jesus Christ we contemplate the unique meeting point of the human and the divine on the field of history--a being in whom the human and the divine subsist together in extraordinary and wonderful, but no unnatural union."

Help to "approximate explication" Prof. Sheldon finds in four considerations. First, the doctrine of the ideality of space makes it unnecessary to suppose that in the incarnation the Divine was locally confined. Secondly, that Christ's human nature was constituted in union with the Divine. This does not necessarily mean that human nature, regarded as impersonal in itself, received its personality from the preexisting Logos, but that the human consciousness in its increase of capacity, not only received from the Divine, but could thus be enlarged to extraordinary capacity. Thirdly, the inexplicable relation of soul and body provides some help, though it does not afford a complete parallel. In this case the body is merely the instrument of the soul; in the other human nature is agent also. But in the incarnation it is quite possible that, while the human soul was metaphysically distinct, it was also so obedient to the demands of ideal conduct as to be practically the instrument of the purpose and will of the Logos. Such relationship in the fourth place, is illustrated by the relation of the Holy Spirit to the soul of any Christian. But here again there exists a difference. For we must conclude that the unique union of the human and Divine in Christ was a matter of His self-consciousness, whereas the Holy Spirit, though immanent in the sanctified soul, does not come into the sphere of its self-consciousness.

It must be remembered also, that the effort to construe a unitary consciousness for Christ, which consistently combines both the human and the Divine, is not the direct result of any demand of Revelation. We have noted the difficulties that accompany the relation between the temporal and the non-temporal order; we shall dwell on the theoretical difficulties of the doctrine of the Trinity; we cannot adequately construe our own nature and its

free relation to God. But in the doctrine of the incarnation, as well as in the more general doctrine of revelation, there are practical values that cannot be ignored, that have led to all the theoretic discussions of the past, and that bear their own evidence to the truth.

An untold number of practical advantages flow from belief in the Scriptures as a Revelation from God. While we must determine by a priori canons, arrived at by considerations not explicitly stated in that revelation, that we shall regard it as divinely authoritative, still a written record for pedagogical purposes is of the greatest value. The evidences and criteria that lead to our belief in revelation are in large part those that lead to our belief in God and His nature. But opportunity and inclination prevent access to these in their formal aspects on the part of the largest number of men; and it may be said in general that those who attain them in this form have received antecedent aid from the life and influences shed abroad by the Scriptures themselves. The logical and metaphysical in thought does not generally come first in human experience; and many times never at all. But the Scriptures, while not tending to the suppression of the intellect, appeal to the practical experiences, the deeper instincts, and the finer feeling, which, often not explicated by the intellect, are still leading life in the proper direction. Many times it is absolutely necessary to say to the sin-stricken spirit, debauched in life and with power of consecutive thought almost gone, as well as to the innocent child needing practical guidance for its life, "Thus saith the Lord." Under either circumstance metaphysical reasoning is of no avail. To leave the practical direction of the spiritual life of either class to chance until appreciation of the highest intellectual considerations is possible could be like postponing the use of the tooth-brush till mature years, when not merely inclination to its use, but the teeth themselves, would be gone. That the good and great of all ages; that the learned as well as the unlearned; that the superior civilization have made the highest use of the Bible as making a response to the deepest human needs is not only something that appeals to the practical sense of men, but is in the deepest theoretical sense an attestation of the Divine authority of the Scriptures. For, granting theism, the deep and lasting needs of the human heart are the outcome of the purpose and will of God; anything that meets such

need in a pure and high sense must be regarded as the outcome of His will and purpose also. At the present day, therefore, the well-nigh universal use of the Scriptures at stated times unconstrained by arbitrary ecclesiastical authority; the constant examination to which they are subjected; the consciousness that at any regular hour of service millions of others join under their inspiration in meditation and worship; all this is practical and truly objective validation of their authority. They give confirmation to our deepest instinctive, or more highly reasoned, conclusions concerning the nature of God and the constitution of man. Never do we find them departing from personal conceptions of God's nature. Indeed, under their inspiration an atmosphere has been generated that makes it seem an absurdity to the mind untrained in philosphic processes to construe His nature in any other terms.

It may be objected that it is not strange that the Bible meets the needs of human nature when it is nothing but an expression of that nature itself and thus offers merely subjective evidence. But we have already noted the fallacy underlying the notion of that which is called "merely subjective." The expression of human nature in its deepest and most constant form is also an expression of the nature and purpose of ultimate reality, if this be conceived of in personal terms. Indeed we may say that the highest expression of human life, in its most fundamental nature, has an objective validity, as representative of the nature of the absolute, even greater than that of the material world; since the material world without human nature as interpreter has no significance for the finite, whatever it may have for the infinite; and since also in human nature shades of meaning can be more easily discriminated. As a matter of fact, if the Divine uses the human as a medium of revelation, the highest representative of human kind must be thought of as the fittest instrument of the Divine message in its fulness.

This last consideration leads to the thought of the practical value of the doctrine of the incarnation as it pictures Jesus the supreme revealer of truth and the highest ideal of life. It provides a definite practical standard, without the necessity of an appeal to technical epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical criteria, by which to judge

in matters of theological doctrine and ethical principle. Does the Old Testament fall short in its conceptions of God or in its maxims, for man's life? Insofar as it fails to conform to Christ's teaching it must be regarded as imperfect. His message provides a correction and completion of its necessarily unideal nature. Did the apostles always speak with Divine authority, or did the imperfection of human nature curtail their insight, even though under the direction of the Divine Spirit? Appeal to the standards of Jesus provides the great test. Has churchly tradition much or unauthoritative and perhaps harmful nature? The fundamental principles of Jesus must in the long run determine. He mirrored forth the Father as no other; so that whoever enters freely into the spirit of Jesus understands the nature of God. Jesus' daily life of unbroken communion with the Father and loving obedience to His will presents the type for the Christians life. As graphically pictured in relation to many and varied concrete situations that life is furthest removed from the indefinite and the abstract. His life and death of implicit obedience provides a norm of highest ethical intensity for mans life and opens the way to forgiveness on rational grounds and with ethical safeguards. Thus it makes for a feeling of nearness to God and yet prevents presumption. Such nearness is increased by the thought of the infinite condescension of God in uniting Himself with human kind, and provides also for a true sense of the dignity of man in his possibility of being thus joined to Deity in the life of one of its representatives. And whereas the Divine might appreciate the difficulties of human life without an incarnation, by means of such incarnation man at least understands, by help of the knowledge of that High Priest who is not untouched with an experimental feeling of human infirmity, that God appreciates the limitations of human lot.

Concerning the practical value of the mystery of His person we will speak in connection with the mystery of the Trinity and its practical value. Meanwhile in the sense of the canon of consistency, which presupposing an honest, also calls for a consistent, universal, and a personal Absolute, projecting it into being by the free and loving exercise of His power, if Jesus Christ was not as He represented Himself, as His disciples represented Him, as indeed His Church has represented Him throughout the ages; then can no thing of universe which has been the theatre of a career such as His and an influence such as He

alone has created? Granted---- that it is impossible to conceive---- that literary criticism could dissolve away the historical Jesus as presented by the Gospels, yet still have His influence in history to form. Principal Fairbairn puts the problem most eloquently. (The Philosophy of the Christian Religion, p. 14) "For Christ has to be fitted into our scheme of things and we have to explain (1) How He whom we have resolved into a mere Jewish peasant came to be arrayed in the most extraordinary attributes which were ever made to clothe mortal man; (2) how His historical action has corresponded to His fictitious rather than to His real character; (3) and what sort of blind accident or ironical indifference to right can reign in a universe which has allowed to fiction greater powers than have been granted to truth. The question does not relate simply to the apotheosis of Jesus; that is a process which the indolent intellect, if it be also ingenious, can facilely describe. We admit that the process may be stated in terms of such amazing verisimilitude as to turn it into a cogent probability. The question becomes urgent only when the deificatory process has been completed. The deification, if we may so call it, though the term is radically incorrect, has all the effect of the most finely calculated purpose formed after all the needs of man and the whole course of his history has been considered. There is nothing in nature or art that can so well illustrate design or adaptation to an end. And though it be illusory yet it works not as an illusion, but as truth and for it, in a most miraculous way; true men receive it, are made truer by it, so use it as to build the world up in the love and pursuit of the truth as it had never been built up before. As unconscious fiction it is so void of substance as a dream yet it acts upon humanity as if it were the most substantial good which had ever descended upon it out of heaven. And how, by what right, at whose instance, did this thing, the apotheosis which has proved obscure happen? For it is the apotheosis which has proved the real or substantive factor of change. It is not Jesus of Nazareth that has so powerfully entered into history; it is the deified Christ who has been believed, loved and obeyed as the Saviour of the world. The act or process of apotheosis, then, created the Christian religion; and who was responsible for it? If the imaginative peasants of Galilee, they were doing a deed no less wonderful than the creation of the world, and the power of providence which allowed them to do it was concerned in by fiction and make-believe to govern reason and form character.

"But what kind of reflexion is it upon the Maker and Master of the Universe if we conceive Him as consenting to do this thing? Nay, in what sort of light does it set reason, if we imagine it capable of being so deluded and deceived, seduced to martyrdom or compelled to enthusiasm by a mistake. Indeed, if the doctrine of the Person of Christ were explicable as the mere mythical apotheosis of Jesus of Nazareth, it would become the most insolent and fateful anomaly in history. For it could not stand alone, it would affect all thought and objects of thought, 'Here', men would say,'a mere chapter of accidents has made one of the greatest figures of literature the most potent person of all time, the source of a series of illusions which have exercised the most transcendent influence upon the life and destinies of men. If accident and illusion have played such a part in history, what character must we attribute to the power which rules the world? Order in nature is an insignificant idea compared with the idea of order in history; but how con there be an order of the persons who created it be, in the very degree that they are potent, themselves the mere creations of chance, fiction, and pure phantasy?"

3. The Trinity.

As in the case of the incarnation the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is most largely a matter of direct revelation. Rational considerations may lend insight into its truth, but are not of an absolutely necessary cogency. We assume that the New Testament, ascribes personality to Father, Son, and Spirit respectively and places each in the category of Deity. The doctrine of the Trinity, then, is an attempt to reconcile the unity of the Godhead with the fact of some kind of three-fold personal destinction. After discussion of all the data involved, Prof. Sheldon formulates what he deems intelligible of the essential doctrine as follows: (System of Christian Doctrine p. 227) "Corresponding to the threefold manifestation of the Father, Son, and Spirit, there subsist in the Godhead, in a certain logical order, eternal and necessary distinctions which enter into the divine consciousness and determine the perfections of the divine life. To affirm less than this is to fail to do justice to the total data of the subject. To assert much more is to resort to unintelligible categories, or to an unintelligible combination of categories." We have here a most carefully phrased formula that reveals the candid mind of Prof. Sheldon in endeavouring to say neither

more nor less than is warranted. Yet this seems, indeed, more of Trinitarian doctrine than is strictly speaking intelligible; for what eternal and necessary distinctions other than the personal may mean we cannot say; and into the self-conscious and self-directing unity of three self-conscious and self-directing beings we can have no insight, largely perhaps because of the peculiar nature of our own personalities. Prof. Sheldon guards his formula, however, by the following qualifying statement: (p. 226) "The conclusion that the Trinity is unique, or without exact counterpart in the sphere of finite reality, involves the inference that the word "Person", as used in Trinitarian terminology, is employed with some measure of restriction. The assumption of an eternal dependence of the Son and the Spirit upon the Father and the absolute exclusion of the possibility of contrariety of feeling, will, or purpose on the part of the Father, Son, and Spirit enter as limiting notions into the use of the historic term. So long as these limiting notions are firmly grasped, the employment of the word "Person" cannot lead seriously astray; for they safeguard the fundamental unity of the Godhead. In permitting them to rule our contemplation we keep clear of any real tritheistic implication. The thought of God is diversified to us by a warrantable trinitarian representation, but not at the expense of compromizing the conception of a unitary ground of the world."

It is clear from this statement that the difficulties of the doctrine depend upon our conception of personality. With just what "measure of restriction" we are to use the term, Prof. Sheldon does not clearly indicate. While "the assumption of eternal dependence of the Son and the Spirit upon the Father" makes a demand for unity, it lends no insight into the problem of three self-conscious and self-directing personalities existing in self-conscious and self-directing unity, nor does it indicate valid restrictions on the thought of personality that makes such existence appear possible from the point of view of human experience. Moreover, "absolute exclusion of the possibility of contrariety of feeling will or purpose" would seem to cancel genuine self-direction on the part of one or two of the "persons" involved. While, in the light of God's ethical nature, we can speak of "certainty" in preference to the term "probability" in this connection, the term "impossibility" would seem to cancel proper self-determination. The

thought of an eternal organic union, if we may coin a descriptive phrase we have never before seen, may form an appropriate background to the thought of absolute ethical unity, but unless we eliminate genuine personal distinctions, which we have postulated, while we may believe in an absolute certitude we cannot believe in any absolute logical-- as opposed to ethical necessity. The difficulties in the case Horace Bushnell seems to feel in his sermon "The Christian Trinity a Practical Truth". (Building Eras in Religion,- Literary Varieties.II) As he labors with the conception of personality in its relation to man and God. He contends that the term strictly speaking is applicable to man alone and not to God; and when used of God it can be used only in a figurative sense. He does this however, on the ground that the term person must ever be associated with the thought of finitude. Just here we must take issue; for no necesssity of reason demands that self-consciousness and self-direction, the essential marks of personality, cannot be regarded as attributes of the Infinite. On the chief of the difficulties we have just raised Prof. Sheldon comments privately in a note under date of Jan. 24, 1916. With his usual candor he sums up the matter in a most satisfactory manner. "With reference to the exclusion of possible contrariety of will, feeling, or purpose, on the part of the Divine Persons, I would note that the ground of the exclusion is absolutely nothing else than the limitless perfection of the Persons. As the category of perfection applied to God generally excludes the supposition of possible lapse into sin or error, so it excludes the supposition of schism between the Persons of the Godhead. An exclusion of this kind, you will observe, amounts rather to the shutting out of defect or impotency than to a limitation of real power. The Son does whatever He sees the Father doing, but He does it with infinite cordiality and energy of volition

While it is impossible for the human mind, moreover, in its finitude to perfect a psychology of the Divine in His infinitude! the philosopher "is under obligation to postulate suitable conditions for the Divine life as well as to search for unity." And this at least, by analogy from human love and fellowship can be said for the doctrine of the Trinity. If God be love and love demand fellowship, and fellowship of the highest kind subsist only between persons on the same plane then Divine love gets a suitable object and response only in a plurality of Divine persons. That such fellowship should be by means of a Trinity is based

on the contention that fellowship has the most perfect conditions where three are so conjoined that each knows that in the loving contemplation of another he has the unqualified sympathy of a third." So much for any insight into the rational necessity of the Trinity.

As the result of our whole discussion we conclude that the Divine Trinity is sui generis; and that the mode of such existence remains a mystery to men; a mystery in the sense that we have no satisfying insight into its nature. This does not mean that the doctrine is a contradiction, but that faculties and data are not given fully to construe it. We may use Bushnell's words, "The three are persons evidently only in some sense that recognizes a radical unity of substance, which is not true of any three men, some tropical or instrumental sense, that needs not anyway to be, and cannot be exactly, defined. But there are mysteries and mysteries! Some serve no purpose save to further perplex and confuse; some have incalculable practical advantages. Some are wholly opaque and altogether resist insight; others lend themsleves to some measure of insight into the reason for their existence and thus provide help for the human race. Of the latter type is "the mystery of the Trinity." The fact that it is apparently a matter of spontaneous Divine Revelation, and not the projection of the atmosphere of the time in which it was first enunciated; that no previously existing and analogous conception provided a basis for it;, that it was woven into the fundamental attitudes of one who professed direct insight into the fundamental mysteries of ultimate reality, His nature and purposes; all this lends prima facie evidence of the truth of the doctrine.

But it has practical advantages all its own, and some in common with the other mysteries of the Christian faith. As we make a brief survey of these we note again the close connection of the theoretical and practical, separable by abstraction for any special purpose in hand, but the one ever immanent in the other; theory, if true, ever working out in practice, and practice, ever illustrating the truth of theory. The doctrine of the Trinity conserves the unity of God and avoids tritheism. Polytheism not only involves thought in inextricable difficulties, but provides no method of lifting from men the limitations of which they are so keenly conscious. Surrender to one God, who, as sovereign, controls all our limitations makes possible their removal or the lightening of their burdening

power. The doctrine tends to safeguard the distinction between God and his world, and so helps to avoid all the theoretical difficulties and practical dangers of pantheism. To satisfy the demands of infinite love no demand for a necessary evolution of the world from God is felt; the universe exists as an expression of his free act. In the Trinity the thought of God is diversified for us, and some insight into the Divine life, in which the human mind can at least rest, is given. The threefold manifestation represents to us in graphic form God in his works, God in human history, and God in personal relationship. If moreover, human fellowship points toward some kind of fellowship within the sphere of the Divine, the Divine fellowship in turn tends to dignify and enoble our human relationships. This is not reasoning in a circle; it is extracting everything of value from realities revealed as essentially congruous. That the Divine fellowship is in some sense a prototype of the human provides a sense of the eternal fitness of our human relationships. Some are already on such a high plane, and their value is so clearly realized, that they will continue unbroken without assistance. But thousands of men need to be urged from lives essentially self-centered and selfish into circles of mutual helpfulness and self-sacrifice; and the fellowship of the Trinity may be presented as furnishing an inherent necessity, converting or compulsion.

Then, now, we come to the thought of the practical value of the mystery of the Trinity,- and indeed the mystery of the Incarnation-we are led to remark that we cannot equally capitalize all mysteries. Those which appear to be man-made, gratuitous and without any inner necessity,--like the so-called mystery of the Roman Catholic mass,-- which have no inner and divine reality that guarantees their reality as mysteries and reveals them, while not [illegible] as [illegible] mysteries, still as mysteries and transcending the limits of human faculties-- these are practically worthless. But when, as in the case of the Trinity and the Incarnation, we have light in plenty that are well [illegible] and lighted, then through regions of [illegible] twilight, and finally into profound darkness, with the conviction that, though we cannot go further for want of light, there are still vast regions beyond that we should like to explore, [illegible] of our inability, we [illegible] of a [illegible] to [illegible], [illegible] longer see [illegible], and [illegible] in our [illegible], [illegible] over the [illegible]. In [illegible] these [illegible] physical [illegible] of the matter as follows; (p. 181 above)

"By asserting three persons instead of one, also instead of none, it secures at once the practical infinity of God, and the practical personality of God. By those cross-relations of a three-fold grammatic personality, the mind is thrown in a maze of sublimity, and made to feel at once the vastness, and with that the close society also, of God. He is not less personal than He would be under the one personality of Unitarianism, and is kept meanwhile by the threefold personality from any possible denomination under the literal measures of the figure: for God cannot become either one person or three in any literal sense, than stoichiastly held as both." The doctrine of the Trinity, he continues is a revelation of how to keep alive the profoundest, most adequate sense of God's infinity, and, at the same time, the most vivid and intensest sense of his social and mutual relationship as a person. And this, if I am right, is more to say than could be said of any other known or possible denomination for God. Regarded simply as a literary exploit, if that were all, it is at once the profoundest practical expedient ever adopted and the highest wonder ever accomplished in human language." Too much mystery, where there ought to be light, dissipates the sense of reality and provides no ground for a rational faith. But mystery where we would expect it, and under conditions that make it seem a necessity, emphasizes our finite nature, lays stress upon the limitations of our faculties, and gives us a new sense of dependence.

4. The Nature of Man in Moral Matters.

Belief in God as personal, the highest expression of whose nature is Love; in the facts of a special revelation from Him, the record of which we find in the Bible; in the Incarnation of the Son; and in the Trinity; provides a consistent basis for the distinctively Christian doctrine of man. Theories other than the theistic reveal their insufficiency here as they do in their relation to the nature of ultimate reality. They not only fail theoretically to reconcile fundamental elements in man's nature, but they also fail to provide incentive to consciously highest living.

The Biblical doctrine of man's nature affirms that God created man in the Divine Image. He is like God in the sense that he is self-conscious and self-directing; that [illegible] limits he is a true creative agent; that he is under obligation to respond to the

law of love, the expression both of God's nature and God's will. He is the highest representative of the earthly creation and holds a delegated sovereignty over all lower forms of existence. This position would hold good on any theory of inspiration. Even though it be affirmed that the Biblical account were merely the spontaneous expression of man's deepest insight, upon which succeeding generations have set the seal of their approval, then inasfar as man's fundamental nature is an expression of God's purpose, the doctrine is altogether true. Apart from Biblical revelation the conviction of the dignity and supremacy of man in the natural order is the result of instinctive feeling; and we cannot consistently ask him to look at the universe from any other point of view. The most disgusting and intolerable examples of human egotism are best explicable on the basis of a perverted greatness. Non-theistic and anti-theistic theories of the universe fall short of proper anthropological theory because they fail also in adequate theories of the universe, with the nature and ends of which, the nature and ends of man must be intimately connected. The theory of evolution when understood as a description of process and method, with God at the beginning and His goals for man at the end, does not militate against the Christian theory of man. As Prof. Stearns puts the matter (The Evidence of Christian Experience, p. 75) "We object only to the illegitimate use of the theory of evolution, and we claim that it is so used, when it is asserted to be a sufficient explanation of the higher nature of man. If the verdict of the scientific man is needed, we confront the one discoverer of the principle of natural selection with the other, Darwin with Wallace. But it is not a matter of science. Not a particle of scientific truth has been adduced to show that man in his distinctive characteristics is derived from the animal. It is not a matter that can be settled by the comparative sizes of human and brute craniums or the comparative weight of their contents. It cannot be settled by showing in the brute instincts and intelligence the rudiments of the mental powers of man. To exhibit in the calls and cries of animals the beginnings of language does not help the matter. All these facts lie in the sphere common to the animal and man. But when it comes to his distinctive qualities, his self-conscious personality, his reason, with its intuition of universal principles and its power of unifying knowledge and transforming the dead mechanical world into

[illegible] world, [illegible] its [illegible] the scientific theory of evolution [illegible] light [illegible] subject. [illegible] different from [illegible] spiritual [illegible] and [illegible] different explanation.'

If the superiority of Christianity is revealed in its theoretical account of God's nature, [illegible] in the practical incentive it offers to mankind. That [illegible] created in the image of God lays upon us the obligation to live God-like lives. To be perfect, as our Heavenly Father is perfect, means merely that perfection possible to our [illegible] sphere as finite beings. Limited as we are now, we cannot expect exemption from the laws of space [illegible]. But with a sense of worth, befitting those that have creative energies in common with God, though operating in a restricted sphere, we can strive for perfection in ethical and spiritual relationships. The life of Jesus of Nazareth, the Incarnate Logos, indicates the norm and the ideal here. His was a life illustrating perfect love of man to man, and perfect love of man to God. His was a life in which self-surrender and self-assertion were incomparably blended; in which self-restraint did not lead to abnormal reserve or austerity; and [illegible] personal energy did not result in insufferable [illegible] or [illegible] self-advertisement; in which sympathy for men did not issue in insipid sentimentality, or [illegible] self-regard and in transgression of their rights or [illegible] of their high privileges. His life has ever been the largest practical incentive to the nobler living; [illegible] even [illegible] ability to [illegible] in man, the ideals [illegible] by the life of Jesus, combined with [illegible] conviction of personal worth, has ever given [illegible] to [illegible] of the achievement of high character. Agnosticism and positivism, [illegible] in [illegible] of beginnings or ends, and limiting themselves though inconsistently, to observable phenomena, can offer no such hope. Materialism constantly draws attention to the low origin of man, without affirming an immanent ideal or lofty goal as the [illegible] of the animal processes. Pantheism, in that it assimilates the divine to the human, [illegible] the human to the divine, and [illegible] personality to merely a temporary gleam in an otherwise total [illegible], offers no rational incitement to self-development and culture. Selfish satisfaction

in a life destined to succeeding annihilation is the sole incentive it offers.

Yet the moment we hold up to ourselves Christian ideals of life and achievement of character that moment a sense of our own inadequacy of attainment takes possession of us. It consists of a spontaneous consciousness of an essential flaw in our constitution that makes the natural and easy attainment of the ideal impossible. It is this consciousness of a vitiated nature that the Christian story of the Fall explains. To serve this purpose it matters not whether the story of the Fall of Adam be regarded as historically accurate or as parabolic in its nature. To regard it as anything more than an inspired parable, true to the deepest and most constant elements of man's experience, and therefore serving the highest possible purposes, seems to me preposterous. It is not even necessary to maintain a monogenist theory of human origin to hold the doctrine of the Fall and its influence on the subsequent history of mankind. In general anthropologists seem to incline to the monogenist theory, though this question receives little attention from them at the present time. It is merely necessary to maintain--that is both possible and quite probable-- the existence of a vitiating factor in all human life, propagated by hereditary tendencies, due to the prostitution of free will or creative energy in rebellion against felt obligation on the part of one of the earliest of mankinds representatives, who by intermarriage contaminated the whole race with a sinful predisposition. Who dare presume to underestimate the corrupting results of an attitude of immoral self-assertion or unethical self-surrender on the part of one individual only upon the whole of the race, sensitive as a barometer to slightest influences to good and evil, and able to increase the amount of such good and evil as a heritage of joy or an incubus of woe? Following evil predisposition men have continued in willful transgression for which they have felt individual responsibility in proportion as the evil act has seemed a matter of free choice.

Such an account both explains the presence of constitutional contamination, and emphasizes the need of a radical change in human nature as the beginning of new tendencies in the life. A little reflection makes clear the inadequacy of any other theory to generate this sense of need. They must all acknowledge the corruption, but as unable consistently to explain it, they can offer no adequate remedy, and generally attempt some

palliation. "To clap a purple patch of rhetoric on the running sores of humanity" may temporarily eliminate the sense of need, but it does not cure the disease, and merely puts off the evil day when the burden of woe is doubly increased and it is perhaps too late to apply the proper remedy with the best results. "Sin is due to a survival of animal tendency which will disappear with the progress of evolution", is one cry. But many of the most damaging forms of willful evil have no intrinsic connection with the body. Moreover, no impersonalistic scheme of the universe offers a warrant for a continuous evolution upward. It speaks confidently of reversions to type, but never with greatest conviction of increasing approximation to an ideal. As a matter of discrimination, however, the term "retrogression" instead of "reversion to type" is a preferable one, since anthropologists differ in their explanations of the status of the lower forms of mankind. The theory growing in acceptability is that the lower forms of men represent a falling away from, rather than a return to, the original type. "The difficulty is with human environment," is another shiboleth. But no student of human nature or worker for reform has ever been able to produce outward conditions that alone will stem the tide of willful misdoing. An effort to this end has its value, as all life is necessarily influenced by the general conditions of its living; but such influence on the bent of the will is not primary. "The need of the race is education," is a third cry of the closet philosopher, whose experience with the rank and file of human kind, has not been at that close range that brings the realization that men in general do not deeply desire academic education, and that it merely increases efficiency of tendencies already operating. While it makes the sincere man more capable in goodness, it helps to make the rascal only more perniciously destructive. All such theories admit the presence of a need, but do not describe it as a deeply vital one. Under their tutelage a profound sense of destitution is postponed, and in many cases altogether eliminated. In the atmosphere generated by them spiritual apathy and irresponsiveness become a chronic condition. On the other hand the Christian doctrine of the Fall and its constitutionally damaging results clarifies rather than confuses the mind; stirs the feelings to a sense of the need of assistance from a source higher than the human, and arouses the mind to a conviction of its responsibility.

[illegible] Christian [illegible] of man's first nature by grace, [illegible] by sin, proceed on the conception of his power or freedom. Our total [illegible], indeed, [illegible] itself on the primary self-experience of man as a [illegible] personality; conscious of himself [illegible] undivided; poising himself in deliberation; capable of rational choice; able to select one out of two or more ends in action with understanding of their nature and mutual relationships; with full capacity to have chosen otherwise; in short, possessing truly creative or originative power. We noted that to this category of freedom the category of causality and the conception of natural law is secondary. Causality is a category that is seen to arise logically from this consciousness of creative energy and the experience of impact with the world outside the self. Moreover, the conception of causality founds itself upon the experience of a self-chosen regularity, made possible by the self-determining power of the individual; and secondarily, by analogy from civil law which is itself a codification of [illegible] regularity, the expression of the self-poised deliberation of some, laid down as a norm of conduct for others. The term "natural law" is generally used to describe perceived regularities in the material world; but it gives not the slightest indication of the nature of the force positing these uniformities. Our previous investigation made it necessary for us to conclude that this force is personal. To attempt as do the [illegible], to [illegible] the category of personality in the human sphere of one of its primary elements, self-determination, by the help of the category of causality and the conception of natural law, to both of which [illegible], is to indulge in the most ludicrous inconsistency. We conclude, then, that the fundamental evidence for human freedom arises from the primary experiences of self-conscious deficity. Yet in addition we find it necessary adequately to explain the facts of responsibility as felt by the individual and as assumed by society; the experience of mutual deliberation, and as we noted before, the deal-lying conviction of profound differences between truth and error, and the rapidity of great moral transitions either toward good or evil that are most adequately explained by some element of arbitrariness. If, though not in [illegible] sense, human personality, like Divine Personality, is an originative agent, as such it is not absolutely involved in a causal nexus. As Ulrici puts it, "Every [illegible] self-[illegible] [illegible] out of nothing."

(Gott und die Natur p. 524. quoted by H. C. Sheldon System of Christian Doctrine p. 297.) This of course, implies inexplicable elements, but so does every other item of experience that we cannot involve in a causal nexus. Lotze strongly emphasizes this when he says, "Every determination of a free will must, as respects its origin, be inexplicable, for to explain means nothing else than to show that a particular event follows from its antecedents in accordance with universal laws. The incomprehensibility of the free determination is therefore no obstacle to accepting it, but a consequence of its proper idea "Grundzuge der praktischen philosophie, 2 te aufl. p. 29, quoted from footnote in above,) This does not mean that the past of any life does not influence its present or future, or that environment does not affect it in any way. Constant choice of either good and evil tends towards fixity of character; and present character largely determines future action. He that freely chooses evil becomes the willing slave of evil; and he that freely chooses good the voluntary servant of good. Both final states are what we might expect: the one represents an abuse, the other the use, of a Divinely beneficent law. Moreover, the assertion of freedom in relation to environment means merely that no outward circumstance compels to moral evil. Environment provides the theatre of moral acting, but it does not write the play. But whatever be the fixity that character attains, it is a genuine question whether a finite being can ever reach absolutely permanent moral stability. While we must postulate this of God as absolutely wise and holy, it is no necessary characteristic of men continually changing for better or for worse. At the same time no reason prevails why continuance in good or evil may not result in such permanence that the impossibility of further change is practically certain.

Thus far we have viewed the Christian doctrine of freedom as a speculative necessity to explain human experience adequately. But counted true as such, it is also a practical expedient for generating a much needed sense of responsibility and of bringing men to a realization of crisis in the issues of moral good and evil. In this way experiment in practical living confirms the truth of theory. The doctrine puts the practical responsibility for moral evil, where it belongs, on the perverse action of men's wills. It emphasizes the fact that the past is largely the product of each action, and is yet possible of recreation by the cooperation of good-will with the greater good-will of the Infinite Father. It [illegible] for self-possession, self-poise, and a supreme output of

genuinely creative energy in meeting the present issues of life. It lays stress upon the fact that the moral aspects of environment are also largely the result of man's will; that he ought resolutely set his face against those things that tend toward evil; rise superior to them and so reconstruct the whole that it will more and more tend toward the good. Such challenge acts as a tonic to the normal moral life, and proper response to it invigorates character. If it be objected that a refusal upon the part of any rightly to accept such challenge makes for lines of demarcation in the social order, and a consequent spirit of antagonism and hostility between men, it must be answered that such lines have already been implicit; that response of one kind or other to the challenge merely indicates the existence of, but does not create, the lines; and that explicitly to know them makes for clarity of vision, and a proper estimate of the forces of evil that must be met. Such seems to have been the method of Jesus, who never complacently suffered illusions as to the nature and power of evil and the necessity of constantly combating it with the practically limitless energy of a resolute and vigorous will.

With such a background of truth as we have been describing,--- the existence of an all-loving and all-righteous Person, back of the universe and yet immanent in it, with a revelation of man's nature and end through His only begotten Son, Jesus Christ, with man's first nature, made in the image of God, capable of restoration from second nature, with man endowed with regal creative powers that largely fix his ends here,-- there can be no rational question as to what the consistent destiny of the good man must be in the future. Granted a consistent universe, and though we have had experience in only one part, we may be certain of what, in general, the other part must be like. It is with this deep certitude, founding itself upon the nature of God, that Jesus speaks of the general fact of man's immortality, "Now that the dead are raised, even Moses shewed at the bush, when he called the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living: for all live unto him." It is because God is what he is, and man is what he is, that immortality must supervene upon mortality. It is this that makes the argument from the universal desire for immortality highly cogent. Non-theistic philosophers may argue that the fact of immortality, deduced from the universal

desire for it, is a non sequitur: there is no necessary rational connection between the two. But such a conclusion holds merely for an atheistic system. Believing, however, as we must, in theism, we must conclude also that the God, who endowed man and with a universal and permanent desire for immortality, cannot be true to Himself and deny man what He thus has implicitly promised him. The non-theist, indeed, cannot account for even the existence of the desire, as the clumsy efforts of Herbert Spencer make quite clear. That man should dream of those whom he has loved and lost seems quite natural; and that the dream should beget a vivid belief in immortality seems equally natural. But why he should love, as well as lose, is a deeper question still, which Spencer cannot answer, because, as we have seen, being unable to account for beginnings, he cannot account for ends; and, as we shall see in a moment, the desire for immortality is not merely the result of bereaved human love. But be that as it may, if our preliminary analysis has been sound, the existence of a genuinely universal and permanent desire in the race is an indication of the nature of ultimate reality, and a piece of evidence, not merely subjective but having bona fide objective validity.

Yet, as we have intimated, this universal desire is not merely the product of affection; it is also with deeply ethical natures the result of a consistent demand for a prevailing justice and righteousness. Save for purposes of clearness by help of abstraction, no need exists for a disjunction between love and righteousness; for response to righteousness must in the long run ever be knit up with the highest kind of love. Both love and righteousness demand that there be a readjustment of the plainly manifold injustices of the world; that evil be plucked from its seat of temporary power and righteousness elevated to its throne of perpetual sovereignty; that the incomplete results of the cooperant toil and sacrifice of man and God, should take on full-orbed completeness; and that those who spent their energy, their anxieties, their tears, and maybap their lives should live to see this glorious triumph.

In satisfying these demands, we also satisfy the deepest demands of our intellectual natures for consistency. What kind of a world would this be in which the manifestly deepest

and highest parts of our affectional and moral natures, attesting themselves as such by their admittedly self-evidencing power, were destined to final and complete disappointment? From the point of view of human reason and human experiences---- and it is the only point of view from which we can look---- certainly not a consistent world! When, then, we add to these disappointments those that, under such conditions, must be sustained by the sacrificially religious nature,-- that which relates us to God in loving loyalty--the sense of total failure and frustration is complete. Christian love to God has for its objects both the human and the Divine. It is a love for "the man Christ Jesus;" it is a love also for the eternal Father, Son, and Spirit. It is mixed with the most holy sense of awe, reverence, and humility that prevents presumption; it is blended with the most lively realization of favor that begets joy, gladness, and freedom. In Father, Son, and Spirit, are the foundations of life's highest meaning and values but experienced only in part now and seen through a glass darkly. Only as in another world we see face to face, and know as also we are known, shall satisfaction come to desire, affection, intellect, and moral nature in their human relationships; and only as thus we live more immediately in the presence of God, with the temporarily imposed limitations to perfect expressions of love done away, shall we all continually love God as we ought with heart, mind, soul, and strength. To bar human nature at this point leaves the universe in an opaqueness like the blackness of mid-night.

To this conclusion the revelation of Jesus, as of One possessing intuitive insight, most explicitly testifies. With the truth of it He involves the integrity of His own moral character with the unqualified affirmation, "If it were not so I would have told you." With it, also, the apostolic writers agree. "Without a life to come we are of all creatures most miserable." With it, finally, many analogies from the natural world, all the deductions from the superiority of spirit over matter, all the historic facts of resurrection, and all the implications of the almost universal survival of the belief in its truth-- are in most hearty concord.

The survival of the doctrine witnesses to the practical need of it, and, inasmuch as the practical needs of human nature reveal the constitution and purpose of ultimate reality, we must believe that evidence for the doctrine has objective validity. In its Christian form it is indissolubly joined with the possibility of a new life here; that life is made over

With mighty spiritual power here, is an evidence that it can be continued in power beyond. At the same time the short life here provides in itself no rational warrant for continuance of life hereafter. Rather, does the doctrine of immortality provide rational stimulus to that attitude of the life here that makes continuance in a regenerate state possible. If we are to die like the beasts the whole tendency of the rank and file of mankind is to live like the beasts. Append immortality to mortality, however, and you alter life's whole perspective. Successful episodes and triumphant accomplishments which would loom large here this life to end all become insignificant in the light of eternity. Educators with genuine insight into the needs of youth in its relations to mature life are emphasizing the need of such perspective in the preparation even of school curricula. On the other hand, without such perspective, labor, self-denial, and self-sacrifice, even unto death, for the ordering of life in accord with theistic postulates would be irrational: for, as we have seen, immortality necessarily follows upon Christian theism. To live in the high dignity of a son of God, in the necessary self-renunciation, the adequate self-restraint and the proper self-assertion one must be able to live in the great hope of eternal heirship in God. It is a matter of common historical knowledge that when the hope of immortality wanes, despair takes hold of men, and worthy living in this life becomes well-nigh impossible.

From what we have said on the general subject of immortality it must not be inferred that we maintain that immortality follows from the constitution of man. As life is a free gift of God and its continuance conditioned upon His immanent working, so life after death must also be conceived of as a free gift and its continuance dependent on His will. Moreover, as the continuance of life here is possible only on human compliance with conditions fixed by God, so we must regard eternal life also as made actual not merely by God, but by a proper human regard for fixed conditions also. Immortal life is then, as the New Testament in parts represents it, in the nature of an achievement. No necessity rests upon God to continue the existence of one who remains persistently rebellious, and who, constantly suffering the results of his voluntary violation of the laws of God, man and of his own nature, eventually becomes a blot and a stench in a normally beautiful and wholesome universe.

These considerations must limit our view of the Scriptural representation of the destiny of men in the next life. Christ assumed an everlasting retribution of the irretrievably wicked. Their loss is to be conceived of as irreparable, not because the loving heart of God is no longer open to appeal, or because at any time He becomes other than the Father of everlasting mercies, but because, practically speaking, it is quite possible to think of a man, who has reached such a state of perversity by constant and wilful rebellion against his sense of duty, that the good no longer makes an appeal to him! and that therefore, he will not make appeal to God. It is this state of perversity that Christ describes as an "eternal sin", "blasphemy against the Holy Spirit", "which hath neither forgiveness in this life nor in the life to come." But after due tribute has been paid to righteous love no rational necessity remains to mar the universe further by continuing the existence of monstrous disfigurements. We can conceive of men, eliminating their capacities of soul, suffering, as they do in this world, the results of wilfully transgressed law, completing this work of voluntary self-destruction! until they are allowed to flicker out of existence like a candle. That this result is quite consistent with human reason and experience would appear from the attitude of one like Prof. James, who showed none too much personal sympathy with the Christian system of truth. "In particular this query has always come home to me. May not the claims of tender-mindedness go too far? May not the notion of a world already saved in toto be too saccharine to stand? May not religious optimism be too idyllic? Is no price to be paid in the work of salvation? Is the last word sweet? Is all 'yes, yes' in the universe? Doesn't the fact of 'no' stand at the very core of life? Doesn't the very seriousness that we attribute to life mean that ineluctable noes and losses form a part of it, that there are genuine sacrifices somehow, and that something permanently [illegible] and bitter always remains at the bottom of the cup?" (Pragmatism, p. 295)

This suggests, if it does not embody, the Christian doctrine of the [illegible] and the necessary sufferings of the continuously perverse. Its practical value is [illegible] needs no emphasis. Its incitement to a consideration of the serious issues of life and to high and holy loving in the present is undiminished save where its presentation is omitted or its [illegible] with reality [illegible]. [illegible] of considering its truth in the

light of consistency pragmatically defined as do not [illegible] in the [illegible] of judging it by [illegible] in relation to present activities alone. [illegible] by the relations of consistency with other verified or verifiable truths also, and by [illegible] the doctrine works in the long run. Candid examination reveals no inconsistency. Retribution follows wilful transgression in one way or another in this world by the operation of physical, mental, and spiritual laws as well as by duly legalized penalty; and so [illegible] it should not follow in the next. The ravages of sin reveal themselves in a decrease of bodily health and vigor, in declining mental strength, alertness, and insight; and in a loss of spiritual capacity and sensitivity. A human will consciously fixed in rebellion to God inevitably means alienation from Him here; and persistence in like attitude in the future must inevitably mean alienation and accompanying misery there. If the doctrine is in part a failure now, and does not work it is because it has received no little stress due to timidity and confusion of thought that it does not work because it is not applied as "it set out to work." Our difficulty in this regard is with the 'tender hearted' who have been so removed from the realities of human intercourse in its vicious and perverse aspects that they have not been willing to be driven to the conclusion with which Prof. James tough-mindedness agrees. On this matter he concludes: "The way of escape on this system is not by getting it 'auf gehoben' or preserved in the whole as an element essential but overcome. It is by dropping it out altogether, throwing it overboard, and getting beyond it, helping to make a universe that shall forget its very name and place."

[illegible] that the doctrine furnishes the highest motive to Christian living, but that in the present condition of human nature it offers a necessary and perfectly legitimate one. To the absence, in late years, of stress on this doctrine on the part of those who profess to believe it we may attribute much of the irresponsiveness of the [illegible] of the people of this land to Christian appeal. That it is not contrary to the fundamental Christian principle of love goes without saying to those who do not insipidly [illegible] vapid sentimentalism, lacking the customary ethical intensity of Christianity. To-day that unique spiritual genius "Billy Sunday" makes deep appeal to great multitudes in which he

[illegible] upon the doctrine of retribution [illegible] which is indeed "the [illegible] theory of literal hell-fire." His congregations do not consist merely of the poor, the ignorant, the unsophisticated, but largely also of the wealthy, of the learned, and of men and women of the world; and in the remarkable spiritual atmosphere generated under his direction, all alike yield themselves in loyal surrender to the person and principles of Christ. Their response, as we have intimated, may not always be to the highest motives; but it at least provides an entering wedge, of which Christ Himself made avail, for the beginning of larger appreciation and the appeal of finer motives. Any other conduct but a proper response to the doctrine, of believed true, would be irrational. Adequate provision to meet a present and future certainty reveals the presence of a much needed good-sense which helps toward better things.

As falling short of presenting the highest motive the doctrine is not calculated to stimulate to the finer qualities of life. With an appeal to fear it exerts a repressive influence upon evil doing rather than offers a stimulus to Christian service. The noblest Christian service is always gladly and ungrudingly performed; and fear is not a motive urging to the most generous forms of activity. But that the doctrine suffers from the limitations of its own nature is no adequate charge against it. It is not designed for [illegible] from other parts of the Christian system. Our experience with [illegible], however, produces the conviction that a wholesome respect for the penalties that follow upon violated law is a prime inducement to a needed self-restraint; and while processes of inhibition are not the end of Christian living, they make room for the incoming of better things.

To those better things the Christian doctrine of heaven offers a larger incentive. The sneer of the cynical that it makes an appeal to fundamental selfishness is founded on a misconception of the meaning of the doctrine, made possible by the figurative language of the Scriptures in describing heaven and the survival of a barbarous grossness of imagination within the pale of a church that has been only partially Christianized. The chief cause of heavenly blessedness, as indeed, the chief cause of earthly, is our filial relation to God. In that love to God as His children makes all men of like mind members of the same family,

it calls for proper love of man to man. Heaven represents moreover, what we do not find on earth, an adjustment of environment to the life of each individual into which overwork, pain, sorrow, death and moral evil cannot enter; and an adjustment of each individual to it. It offers perfect stability without monotony, and generous variety without surfeit both in the nature of God and its infinite possibilities, and the marvels of His works into which, as we are slowly discovering, the wonders of the present universe give insight only by way of suggestion. If to aspire to such conditions is selfishness unadulterated, then we need more unadulterated selfishness. If to use the means to attain these ends be also an expression of supreme selfishness, though it involve complete self-renunciation, self-denial and self-sacrifice, sometimes to self-immolation, then mankind should pray for its largest increase. Indeed, in adopting the means we have already partially gained the desired ends; for heaven in its essential nature is the completion of that Kingdom of God the life of which begins, as the principles of which are embraced, on earth. But in this way the cynics sneer becomes an absurdity. Proper self-love is always consistent with a rational altruism. If this is a consistent universe then there must be an intrinsic relation between goodness and final happiness. At the same time in this world the genuine Christian ever receives sufficient test to demonstrate whether his loyalty and devotion to truth, to right, and to God are bona fide or whether they are merely an expression of his belief that honesty, righteousness, and godliness, are the best policy; for adequate adjustment of moral issues is not always made in this world in individual cases. The Christian subscribes to the principles of the Kingdom of God primarily because they are intellectually, morally, and spiritually sound, not because subscription nets him individually a life of external ataraxy, or freedom from persecution and suffering. It does this in the average case, and in the long run; and the obligation to subscription would not be rational--a consistent part of a consistent universe in which God as loving Father and moral Governor is sovereign,-- unless realty to it, in a run long enough to embrace both earth and heaven, had most happy result.

Though he notes many inequalities and injustices in this life, the Christian presses on in the path of duty; true first of all to his best nature and his clearest light; and knowing that, in a consistent universe, created and upheld by the good God, adequate

adjustment will be made in due time and not overdue eternity.

B. Application of the Criterion to the Interior Processes of Christian Consciousness.

The objective truths of the Christian system find confirmation in the evidences from Christian consciousness. What happens in practice in the experience of a multitude of individuals thus confirms conclusions already reached; and thus Christian certainty increases and intensifies. In his notable work "The System of Christian Certainty," Prof. F. R. M. Frank considers the whole matter of Christian Certainty from the point of view of one who has already attained the distinctively Christian consciousness. But no one ever complies with the conditions necessary to entrance into the Christian life, as such, unless, by the processes of life and thought as a natural man, he has already achieved a measure of preliminary certainty with regard to the Christian doctrines of God, Man, and Revelation. On the strength of this preliminary certainty he embarks on the great Christian experiment; confirms in practice the truths that he has already held; adds to his stock of truths; and so enlarges his certainty. It is for this reason we have chosen our order of themes instead of the one taken by Frank.

We have used the term 'interior' instead of 'subjective' in connection with the processes of Christian consciousness to avoid misconceptions from the use of the latter term to which we have constantly alluded. The growth of the new science of Psychology and the increase of interest and the multiplication of volumes relating to the facts of religious experience have established the scientific value of the evidences from the Christian consciousness. Certain great regularities obtain here as in nearly every other field of human experience. Where such uniformities exist, we have all the objective validity of material facts, combined with the advantage of more immediate experience. The continuous experiences of Christian consciousness are as close to the centers of thought and life as any primary mental activity. Logically they are prior to an experience with material things. Within the sphere of the individual life they attest themselves to our total inner experience by bringing a sense of inner harmony and consistency, of satisfaction and certainty, that cannot be obtained elsewhere.

They strike a fundamental note in the validation of the truths concerning the transcendent objects of the Christian faith; and, taken in connection with their constant recurrence in other lives to-day, and the testimony of those who have lived in past ages, they constitute a certainty that is impregnable, because wholly consistent in theory and practice.

With preliminary certainty such as we have indicated, there arises first of all in the future subjects of Christian experience a conviction of sin and guilt, more or less profound and intense, in accord with constitution and temperament, age and past manner of life. This is a characteristic of the beginning of all religious life whether we read the autobiographical record of it in the cuneiform tablets of the Babylonians, in the Jewish Psalms, or in the early Christian records with the cry voiced in many ways, "Depart from me for I am a sinful man, O Lord" or "Wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" A theistic faith with a doctrine of Revelation that presupposes a solicitous and a seeking God on the errand of salvation through the work of His Only Begotten Son and the Divine Spirit, attributes this conviction to the preliminary operation of God in awakening the human heart to a sense of need. Such need finds expression in several ways: a sense of impending penalty for transgression; a consciousness of guilt for voluntary misdoing; the realization of personal maladjustment in the relationships of life; the conviction of a deep-lying perversion that the human will, with the best of intentions, cannot eliminate, and Divine power alone radically affect. Beyond question such a state of mind is generated without the help of specifically Christian teaching, and the strangest explanations offered for its existence. But under Christian teaching the consciousness becomes more intense, the feeling of great crisis more acute, and theistic explanation appears more reasonable.

It remains, then, to explain why, as in our own time, conviction of sin has not appeared more widespread and profound. Many causes of course, both theoretical and practical, coöperate in bringing about such a condition. Among these we may name anti-theistic theories of reality, the growth of a destructive Biblical criticism, the spread of an irreligious and unethical ecclesiastism, the individual unfaithfulness of ministers, whose courage and insight --two vitally related factors--fall short in the preaching of the truth, the [illegible]

depends on intense conviction of its genuineness and the felt sense of conscious dedication to it. It is a note-worthy fact that theoretical uncertainties, as they rationally stand, are not the prime causes of such a situation: the rank and file of men are not generally able to understand the questions at issue. Rather are they found in a skeptical atmosphere, generated by "the evil heart of unbelief," which readily seizes upon the flimsiest rational considerations, whose true meaning is not at all understood, and which [illegible] in [illegible] conscientiously [illegible] conduct. The age-long sins of greed, lust, and individual ambition, reaching [illegible] material possessions and personal power for selfish ends, are still prime factors making for spiritual indifference, apathy, or defiance of the right, [illegible] in absolute collapse. At the same time it has been my experience--and in the nature of the case the individual's experience, by the special arrangement of Providence for moral reasons, must be his [illegible] of last resort-- that the faithful and heroic preaching of this truth, so close to the nature of man, while it tends to arouse all his native antagonisms, finds [illegible] in the lives of many hard hearts or stirred to such sense of burden that they cry again, "What must I do to be saved?"

When such a cry issues from the human soul it is ready for the experience God has prepared for it. It will turn from its past sin to the ideals fixed in Christ. It has already shown a measure of faith that will issue in loving loyalty to God as revealed by Christ. It will crave a new life, the consciousness of His favor, and the certainty of sonship in Him. It will strive to fulfill the destiny He has purposed for it. Therefore repentance will follow conviction; Christian faith in both will become the conscious and self-chosen attitude toward Him; regeneration and justification, subjective and objective aspects of the same great experience will accompany genuine faith; the witness of the Spirit will bring a new sense of certainty; and the soul will begin the march toward sanctification, that [illegible] of its existence, where it will no longer consciously break God's law, having attained a proper love toward both God and man, and being aided by Divine power.

Sorrow for sin and turning to a consciously obligatory ideal is the essence of repentance. It is an experience with which all religions are familiar. In Christianity, however, we find the only sufficiently adequate ideals of life concretely presented in the manner of

Christ, and therefore the only proper delineation of sinful conduct. Good presumption and good delineation makes Christian appearance go to the very roots of life. As Christian experience proceeds, as the ideals of Christian living become clearer, as application of the principles of Christ necessarily covers in thought an ever widening sphere of life, as the sense of having fallen short grows deeper, the realization of the need of repentance, involving the profoundest attitudes of the soul, at every smallest lapse grows more urgent. New duties emerge, never considered such before, and call for Christian obedience. The spirit grows more sensitive to the demands of its ideals; it is stricken with an increasingly greater horror at even involuntary lapse from them; it turns again with increasingly greater responsiveness also from such lapse to its consciously chosen ideal. Already, as we have suggested, this process has been due to an implicit faith. No conviction of sin can come unless there has been an assent, involving faith, to an obligatory ideal, from which we realize we have fallen short. No turning away from sin to God and His ideals for man follows unless personal surrender to Him has been made. Theistic faith is a trustful, loyal, self-committal to oneself to God; and Christian faith is this same self-surrender to God as revealed by Jesus Christ. It is not some intellectual assent to a set of propositions, however true they may be, though it is closely allied with knowledge. Indeed, as our preliminary investigation revealed, faith is a presupposition of knowledge: the kind of faith that first trusts the instruments of knowledge; that, having found consistency the only possible test of truth, is willing to apply it in innumerable cases with the definite hope of always obtaining the same uniform results, when the conditions of each experiment are carefully guarded; that believes that this is a consistent universe; that cleaves to consistent thought in consistent life as further leading to truth; that, when it finds the person of God as revealed in Christ the author of truth-- for truth and righteousness are but the expression of His nature, His will, and His works-- yields itself in hearty surrender to Him. It would seem, therefore, that the somewhat common disjunction between knowledge and faith does justice to neither. For it presupposes knowledge to exist without an implicit faith; and faith as an attitude of belief in the face of knowledge. Yet, as we have seen we never reach knowledge without implicit faith; and growth in faith must be [illegible]

knowledge. The faith, therefore, that issues in trust in God is at one place with the faith that has issued in knowledge. Properly analyzed it gives evidence of the continuous existence of a single ethical attitude that has come to its proper end in certainty, and in certainty only because it has also issued in ethical conduct.

In accord with Christian Revelation when man takes this attitude toward God, God initiates a fundamental change in man's nature. At this point of the need of Christian faith the Christian parts company with the non-Christian. While both operated under the same formal condition of obtaining truth, the standard of consistency, both do not operate under the same material condition, the possession of the same data. The Christian has entered a realm of evidence into which the non-Christian has not gone. Those experiences, which [illegible] strictly speaking, he called Christian, cannot have the same cogency for the latter as for the former. If the latter makes room for them at data at all, it is only by help of the witness of the former in word and life: and the experiences of others, into which he enters merely through a description of their actuality, can never possess the same meaning for me as if we really entered into them ourselves. This means that the non-Christian will never attribute the same weight to the peculiarly Christian experiences as the Christian is compelled to do. Insofar as he fails in ethical consistency, he fails of entering into a sphere of new data. He may operate with a formal canon of purely intellectual consistency as in the case of F. H. Bradley, and with the same futile results. But what in Bradley's case seems to be a lack of insight into the logical results of his own methods, in the case of one who has evaded ethical issues, will result in one or another form of practical unbelief, and what must be thought of as conscious or implicit, intellectual hypocrisy. In St. Paul's view to such as "received not the love of the truth that they might be saved" there comes "a working of error that they should believe a lie." Here, then, we find the tragedy of the search for truth, which logically implies a deep ethical attitude: that when undertaken without such attitude, and by help merely of the formal canon of consistency, it results in falsehood. In any case the more careful use of such canon with all it ethically implies, and a sharp eye to practical results in the long run will afford proper guards to our conclusions.

The practical results of an attitude of Christian faith in the individual Christian life are both interior and exterior. The change within the realm of consciousness may differ with the constitution and temperament of the subject of regeneration. To one who has been nurtured from child-hood in a Christian atmosphere and continually responded more or less unconsciously to its influences, the sense of change in deliberately taking such an attitude is not so marked as in the case of another who for years has been given over to the grossest forms of evil and in whom the change must necessarily be cataclysmic. At the same time it must be remembered that sensitiveness to the power and virulence of evil is not the especial possession of the gross transgressor, but oftentimes also the experience of children, to whom a long career in evil, measured by the yard-stick of human standards, has been impossible. Both the Old and the New Testaments, though often in figurative language, picture the change in the strongest terms. That our description may be free from the suspicion of personal bias we use the words of another. "This new life involves a radical transformation of the whole man. The strong language employed in the Bible to describe it is not too strong to truly characterize the fact. The change is a "new creation", "a passing from death unto life," a "resurrection," a "new birth." The subject of it has become a "new man;" he possesses a "new heart." It is in truth a complete moral and spiritual revolution. Some of our most thoughtful modern theologians do not hesitate to translate the Biblical terms into the technical language of philosophy, and to declare that the result of the change is a "new personality," a "new ego" with a new self-consciousness. We need, it is true, to be on our guard, lest we take these expressions, biblical and theological, with absolute literalness. The bond of personal identity between the old man and the new is not severed. The self is essentially the same, and this is true also of the man's faculties and powers. The subsequent struggle with remaining sin proves to the Christian's sorrow that the "old man" is not by any means wholly overcome, but exists alongside of the new man, though dethroned from its dominion over the soul and excluded from the center of the regenerate life. Nevertheless these strong terms are more than figures of speech. They strive to express the overwhelming greatness of a change, that to him who experiences it, is marvellous. Even the outsider sees something of it, and is compelled to confess that it is passing strange.

"This inner transformation is the beginning of redemption. It is the breaking of that power of sin, which has held the soul captive, the restoration of the soul to its true relation to God, from which it has been separated and alienated, and under whose displeasure it has rested; the return of the man from false ends to his one true chief end; the rehabilitation of the divine image in him; the opening of the fountain of eternal life. The man has "come to himself" (Luke xv. 17.) He is in the way of realizing the "end immanent in his personality." (L.T.Stearns, "The Evidence of Christian Experience, p., 131,1.2.)

A change as profound as the one described by these words would naturally affect the whole being. It often makes itself felt first in the physical constitution and so involves the feelings. Since the whole nature of man reflects itself most vividly in the feelings this is what we should expect. A strange sense of physical lightness oftentimes; a strange sense of brightness, that resembles now inner, now outer, physical light; a new sense of harmony and concord with all things: with God and all men, with material surroundings and duties in life; an all-pervasive joy and gladness, that often manifests itself in exhuberance and sometimes a holy hilarity-- these are marks of a deep change in the feelings. The soul goes out in love toward God; it is pervaded by a sense of warmest personal affection and deepest regard for Christ; it is conscious of the indwelling of the Spirit of God. We do not maintain that this three-fold distinction in idea of the objects of its feeling would be possible without the help of the Christian Revelation. Revealtion directs the Christian's thought in this three-fold experience, and thus he verifies the truth of the Word in his own life.

The effect of this change is also marked in the clarification of the intellectual processes. We have noted the close relationship between the application of the canon of consistency and man's ethical bearing. When the ethical bearing is absolutely unvitiated, it is to be expected that this will affect the intellect. This great truth Christ taught in figurative language, as reported by Matthew. "The lamp of the body is the eye: if therefore thine eye be single thy whole body shall be full of light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness. If, therefore, the light that is in thee be darkness,

how great is the darkness. Naturalistic prejudices interfere with the processes that lead to theistic conclusions. If, moreover, a man be insincere, he will have little experience aiding him to believe in the sincerity of others; and if he believe that the world-ground be personal he will tend to question God's ethical attitude also. If, furthermore, a man be selfish and self-centered, it will be well-nigh impossible for him to believe in the self-sacrifice of others, and especially that God is love, crucified on the cross of Christ. Immediately, however, as multitudes testify, on assuming the proper attitude toward God, as if it had thrown off a great incubus, the mind increases in energy and insight. Things that may have appeared highly questionable before, though all the better forces of life were driving in their direction, appear quite coherent and fall into a harmonious system.

A radical change, moreover, in the supreme choice of the spirit, must necessarily affect all minor choices, naturally directed by it, and so, in the terms of the "faculty" psychology, the regenerate man's will has been transformed. He has made God, His will, and His Kingdom the supreme end of his life. All other items necessarily fall into subordinate place, and all other goals are fixed by this primary attitude. Neither self, nor sense pleasure, nor material possessions, nor personal power,--indeed, no form of self-gratification--is the final aim of life. If these are sought, they are not sought as ends but as means to the greater goal. The old, sinful tendencies, while not totally eliminated, have had their former dominating strength broken. The Christian may not have reached absolute freedom, but he has the promise and potency of freedom, the consciousness that with God's help he can live in accord with the laws immanent in his own nature.

Yet in all this he is quite certain that he himself has not been the primary cause of this great change. He may have complied with fixed prerequisites, without which the new spiritual forces in his life could never have begun operation. But he realizes that he is not their source. God alone could create and continue them. He recognizes that the change is due to God's condescension and an extension of His favor. Upon him comes a consciousness of his sonship in God. Here we have what the Scriptures describe as the witness of the Spirit. "Ye received not the spirit of bondage again unto fear, but ye received the spirit of

adoption whereby we cry, Abba Father. The Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God. God sent forth the Spirit of His Son into our hearts crying, Abba, Father." Harmonizing with these words of St. Paul, the expression of his own experience, is the promise of Christ, "He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him and will manifest myself unto him." Considering it as to its details, the variations of religious experience are many. As there are aberrations of the intellect, feelings, and will in individuals in other relations than the strictly religious, depending in part on hereditary tendency, temperament and training, in short, on the whole constitution of man, so also the Christian life is subject to temporary aberrations from the norm. But granting that the Christian attitude of faith is persisted in, that its subject continues to be a learner of God's truth, that he strives sincerely to adjust himself properly in the varied relationships of his life, such aberrations will gradually tend to disappear. On the other hand many of the differences in Christian experience may well be regarded, not as due to deviations from the norm, but as God's provisions for individual needs, which carry their own self-evidencing power and bring their own assurance the certainty. Oftentimes these cannot be adequately described or communicated to others save by the stimulus afforded by suggestion and the invective to trial in response to need that finally brings similar experience. Of such type of experience we may consider that John Wesley called the direct witness of the Spirit. It is an immediate testimony, bringing conviction in an inexplicable way--but evidently by its own self-attesting power-- of our acceptance before God. The witness of the human spirit, on the contrary, according to Wesley's view, is the inward conclusion that one possesses the fruits of the Spirit. We note in the first place that if our criterion of certainty is a correct one that consistency pragmatically defined must be the standard that tests our certainty. Whatever be the nature of the direct witness, therefore, it must attest itself as harmonious with the other elements of our experience; and if the witness be genuine the life must also show the fruits of the Spirit. Thus far Wesley's analysis appears to be a correct one, for both the direct witness of the Spirit and the human realization of the possession of the fruits of the Spirit have found their place in the experience of a multitude of Christians. The latter must always be present if we would accept it the former as genuine. But what St. Paul seems to be

speaking of in the words we have under examination is not so much a separate witness of the Holy Spirit and man's spirit to the same fact by different modes, but to a joint operation of the Spirit of God and the spirit of man, producing the consciousness of sonship toward God. By experience the direct witness of the Spirit is not constant and continuous but comes sporadically, especially in the spiritual emergencies of life. The witness of man's inward conviction that he possesses the fruits of the Spirit is the product of the discursive processes of man's intellect. On the other hand, that consciousness of sonship which St. Paul attributes to the cooperative activity of the Holy Spirit and man's spirit is a spontaneous conviction that remains constant as long as we preserve the attitude of Christian faith. We may say, then, that all three elements contribute to the Christian's assurance that he lives under God's favor and stands in relation to Him as a son.

Breaking the predominating power of evil in regeneration, however, does not wholly eradicate evil tendencies. Regeneration with its accompanying sense of sonship, constitutes a beginning in the Christian life and brings its corresponding certainty. But following this there is need of Christian growth, the development of the life to maturity, to the ideals set by Christ. In the Scriptures this process is called sanctification. Entire sanctification would be the achievement of such holiness that the individual would be properly adjusted to God, to the laws of his own being, and to the demands of his neighbors welfare. It would mean at least reaching a plane of life where lawless tendencies would not originate within the soul, or where, when temptation or solicitation to evil assailed from without, evil would be promptly repelled. This does not mean that, as a finite creature, the subject of entire sanctification is not liable to mistake and error. It merely means that as far as his knowledge goes, he does not consciously break God's law. As regeneration, moreover, brings with it a sense of sonship and begets filial love within the heart, so the presence of sanctification intensifies the consciousness of sonship and increases love to God and man. Entire sanctification would therefore mean in this connection reaching a stage of love that is perfect within the sphere of finiteness.

Such a process generally extends over a long period of time. [illegible] with many, [illegible]

believe from experience, [illegible] in this life. [illegible] evidence is [illegible] coming to preclude the possibility of its being consummated in the life of any genuinely striving soul before death. If this comes about it will be due to the creation of attitudes and forces that made consummation possible and that issued in the spirit of sonship and filial love: faith repentance, filial obedience, working through a love that begins to [illegible] a pleasure. Prayer, the study of the Scriptures, the inspiration of common worship, the help of cooperative activity bring in their train a growing holiness in character and [illegible], an increasing knowledge and wisdom, a greater faithfulness and efficiency in Christian service. A new alertness and insight comes to the mind, enrichment and enablement to the feelings, a strengthening to the powers of the will. Until the process is complete the struggle with sin within the soul continues with greater intensity, though also with foregleams of final victory, until evil tendency within the sphere of self-consciousness is removed. Until the end of life, however, the struggle with evil in its varied forms in the world without must [illegible], so the Christian has no opportunity even at this stage to relapse into passive and self-gratified contemplation of his achievements in holiness. He is too busy in [illegible] evil in the life about him, and breaking the power of all unfruitful [illegible] of [illegible] find even time for this. A complacent contemplation of one's own virtues [illegible] is [illegible] of that humility of spirit which we associate with the genuinely holy man. Granted that his powers have normally expanded under the guidance of God's Spirit, a multitude of practical tasks call for his attention. While he must not neglect prayer, meditation, public worship, and the instruction and study that ought to accompany these, neither ought he shirk those manifold duties that in the home, in the school, in business life, in the political world, and in the church press upon every citizen of the Kingdom of God.

A change in the nature of man, as profound as we have described it, must evidently bring its own certainty. The change is not due to his own initiative. The power accomplishing it, he feels quite sure, comes from God. The experiences through which he has [illegible] confirm his preliminary certainties concerning God the Father, Christ the Son, and the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit. It is positively absurd to speak of communion with the [illegible] [illegible]

be in doubt. The purification and enabling of our feelings, the intensification of our moral convictions, the enlargement of our mental grasp and insight, the strengthening of the powers of the will, the heightening of interest in the things of the Kingdom, the increase of anxiety for the lives of others, the growth of joy and gladness in God's presence and service are not experiences communicable to those who have not passed through them. To attempt to describe the solemn sense of God's presence that comes to the seeking soul in the freshness of the morning, or the consciousness of assurance that arises from duties fulfilled that follows in the brightness of mid-day, or the peace that gathers over the soul in the stillness and quiet of the gathering evening twilight to those who scoff at the realities of Christian experience is to cast one pearls of greatest price before the swinish snouts of those who have been swine but little above the animal, with the additional danger that we shall soon feel their tusks as they turn and rend us. But while these experiences upon which we might enlarge, are not designed for the uses of the discursive intelligence--other material and evidence which we have discussed at length elsewhere serving this needed purpose--they are not without their highest value. They bring their own Christian assurance--like none other save that the criterion is the same with all;-- they provide the necessary incentive for the regular duties and emergencies of daily life; they constantly urge us to press the work of the Kingdom of Christ. Without doubt they have their individual as well as their universal marks; and God mediates them to men as He sees that they need and seek. We can urge these as necessary upon others by the power of reason only as they have universal characteristics. At the same time some of individual characteristics are communicable in part by the contagious power of feeling. As they affect our own lives they spontaneously manifest themselves in our feelings, our actions, our attitudes, our facial expressions, our manner of speech, and so tend to affect others as they are able instinctively to interpret meanings and values. But if experiences, which perhaps are highly individualistic and can have no significance and value to others, but which we ourselves particularly need or crave, come in due time and in accord with God's law of love, we may rejoice in them, deepen our convictions, face our duties more confidently, realize the fruitage of faithfulness, and thus having entered more largely into the nature of Christian certainty find less a larger basis for it.

We are brought back to the practical issues of our investigation that must necessarily involve both theoretical and practical aspects. Our time is one of much question and doubt; the fountains of the great deep are being opened; the world is agitated by a most fearful international conflict that now compels inquiry into the fundamentals of life, belief, faith and certainty. Through it all the Christian's God and the Christ of faith are shining more serenely than ever. Not everything that is in God's Providence has been in His purpose. Both, we must believe, however, include a ground for good-will among men and the conditions of progression. Never can we have permanent peace between men and nations until at least a substantial majority cherish the spirit of genuine good-will, and never can we find peace, and the certainty that brings peace, in our individual lives unless in them is manifest also this highest good-will that, finding expressions in manifold ways governed by the principle of intellectual consistency, works out as it sets out to work in our practical living. Permeated by such certainty the citizens of the Kingdom of Christ look back upon the past triumphs of the faith once committed to the saints, and, with all possible confidence, face the present and the future.

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Herman Schultz: Outlines of Christian Apologetics. The MacMillan Co., 1905. Translation from the second enlarged edition, 190[illegible]. Grundriss der Christlichen Apologetic zum Gebrauche bei [illegible] Vorlesungen. Careful reading of large parts: 70 hrs.

[illegible] C. Sheldon: System of Christian Doctrine. Jennings and Graham, 190[illegible]. Careful study, recitations, examinations, papers. Classes [illegible] hours a week for one year with adequate preparation. Perused in large parts several times.

[illegible] C. Sheldon: History of Christian Doctrine. Harper and Brothers, 190[illegible]. Consulted: about 5 hrs.

H. C. Sheldon: Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century. A Critical History. Eaton & Mains, 1907 Careful study with synopsis: about 50 hrs.

H. C. Sheldon: New Testament Theology. The Heintzemann Press. 1906. Study, recitations, examinations, Classes, two hrs.a week for one year with adequate preparation.

Henry Sidgwick: The Methods of Ethics. MacMillan and Co., 1[illegible]. Careful study with synopsis: about 1[illegible] hrs.

Herbert Spencer: First Principles. D. Appleton and Co., 1[illegible]. Sixth Edition. Reading with lectures [illegible] one-half year. Papers, etc.

[illegible] Starbuck: The Psychology of Religion. An Empirical Study of the Growth of the Religious Conscience. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. Third Edition. Reading: 40 hrs.

[illegible] Thilly: Introduction to Ethics. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905. Study, recitations, lectures, examinations, three hours a week for one-half year.

[illegible] B. Titchener: An Outline of Psychology. The Macmillan Co., 1902. New Edition with Additions. Study, lectures, examinations, laboratory work. three hours a week for one year with adequate preparation.

James Ward: Naturalism and Agnosticism. Adam and Charles Black 1906. Third Edition, 2 Vols. Careful reading, answers to prepared questions: about 100 hrs.

[illegible] F. Warren: The Religions of the World and The World Religion. Privately Printed, 1907. Study. recitations, reports on supplementary reading. Classes two hours a week for one year with adequate preparation.

[illegible] Windelband: A History of Philosophy. The Macmillan Co., 1907. Second Edition. Revised and enlarged. Translation: Geschichte der Philosophie. Careful reading, 120 hrs.

Analysis of Introduction and Argument in the Form of a Brief
of Dissertation on
The Nature and Basis of Christian Certainty.

Introduction: The Practical Bearing of Our Theme.

Thesis: The extension of the Kingdom of Christ depends in large part on the strength of Chrsitian Certainty.

A. The need of greatly multiplied Christian effort.

B. The success of the Christian leaders of the past depended largely on their strong convictions.

C. The need of an enlarged Christian certainty to-day.

D. Tendencies to make belief a matter of practical indifference.

1. On the plea of liberty.
2. On the score that certainty would compel obedience.

E. The need of increased certainty to get proper practical results.

F. The relation between the theoretical and the practical evokes this essay.

Part One of Brief Proper.

I. Evidence from the "subjective" aspects of our life in relation to certainty must be regarded as having as great validity as evidence from "objective" aspects, for

A. Experience involves at once a duality of subject and object, each to be considered equally real, for

1. The existence of the self is the fundamental datum of experience.
2. T.H.Green evidences the collapse of the sensational psychology.
3. F.H.Bradley fails to reveal the idea of the self as inconsistent, for

a. He does not distinguish between the self and its contents.
b. He does not properly describe the soul as active.

4. Sensations have both subjective and objective aspects.
5. Subject and object cannot be understood without reference of the one to the other.

B. The subjective has its regularities and uniformities as has the objective.

C. Both are the outcome of the same ultimate force.

II. To the testimony of the senses we apply the criterion of consistency pragmatically defined, implying faith in a consistent universe, for

A. Without this test we would be compelled to embrace solipsism.

B. With this test we distinguish between ideas and their corresponding realities.

C. We are unable to find any other satisfactory test, for

1. Only by appeal to it can we question or approve its validity.

D. Without a consistent universe the test could yield no results.

III. To the testimony of thought we apply the criterion of consistency, pragmatically defined, implying faith in a consistent universe, for

A. We must apply the test of consistency, thus defined to judgment, for

1. We must apply it to the universality of the judgment.
2. We must apply it to the necessity of the judgment.

B. We must apply this criterion to understand the laws of thought, for

1. We must apply it to understand the law of identity.
2. We must apply it to understand the law of contradiction.
3. We must apply it to understand the law of the excluded middle.

C. No essential difference exists between the evidence of the senses and of thought.

IV. To the testimony of the feelings we apply the same criterion, for

A. The intellectual aspects of the feelings lead us to certainty.

B. The regular, universal, and permanent feelings have objective validity as pieces of evidence.

C. The results of the universal and permanent feelings are to be viewed as an indication of the nature of ultimate reality.

V. Finally, to the testimony of the moral nature we must apply the same criterion, for

A. Here the appeal is to the missing element of a necessary whole.

B. For the test implies an honest universe.

C. The use of consistency as a formal test implies the use of a material test, a content to be achieved by sincere search.

D. In the application of the test of consistency, the presupposition is a vital faith,

VI. The Criterion of Certainty must be Consistency, pragmatically defined, for

A. The absolutists definition of consistency, as it appears in Bradley's "Appearance and Reality" is not a consistent one, for

1. Thought has no power, save by abstraction, to separate "content" from "existence."
2. It is not the function of the judgment to apply a content belonging to one existence to another, for
   A. The judgment is not a proposition, the compound of two parts joined by a copula, but an intellectual reaction, bringing meaning to a matter not previously understood.
3. Consistency, conceived of as absolute and all embracing individuality, can never be attained by the finite.

B. In its essentials the pragmatic definition of consistency is the one to which we are driven, for

1. We can only know of the coincidence of our ideas with the absolute by appeal to concrete facts, upon which the standard of consistency is to operate.

Part Two of Brief Proper.

I. The Criterion of Christian certainty is also Consistency, pragmatically defined, for

A. Part of the objects of Christian certainty are also objects of certainty in general.

B. Entrance into the Christian life does not change the nature of mental processes or the criteria of truth, for

1. The Christian lays no claim to direct divine illumination.
2. This would make the teaching of the non-Christian well-nigh impossible.

C. The Christian life brings us into a new sphere of evidence by efforts of the will in practical activity, for

1. This was the teaching of the O. T.
2. This was the teaching of Jesus.
3. This was the teaching of the apostles.

D. The Christian certainty involves the element of faith, though more in a Person, than in truth as an ideal.

E. The Christian certainty implies a sincere and active attitude of the will.

F. In attempting to construe life religiously we are merely entering a different field of evidence, as such, as valid as the field in which we enter

when we attempt to construe it intellectually.

Part Three of Brief Proper.

I. Application of our Criterion to the Christian doctrine of belief in God brings certainty with regard to the truth of the latter, for

A. From the speculative point of view the doctrine is the most satisfactory explanation of the nature of ultimate reality, for

1. The Common theistic arguments sustain the doctrine, for

a. A consideration of human nature as a piece of evidence favors the Christian view of God, for
x. Our consciousness of self-activity is the basis of our conclusion that an ultimate reality must be regarded as a cause of all things.
y. Adoption of consistency as a test points to the unity of the world-ground.
z. Explanation of our own nature demands personality, as holy love, as its cause.

b. The argument from interaction, by analogy from the interaction of the parts of our own natures, demands an immanent, yet transcendent cause.

c. The cosmological argument demands the Christian God as an adequate cause of the world-order.

d. The teleological argument, rooting back in our purposive experiences, demands a personal world-ground.

e. Man's ethical and religious nature calls for the Christian God of righteousness and love.

2. The abstract anti-theistic arguments fail to satisfy intellectual demands, for

a. It is impossible to speak consistently of the natural operation of impersonal law, for

x. We cannot adequately explain the operation of natural law by chance.

y. We cannot adequately explain the operation of natural law by necessity, for
p. The theory of necessity destroys moral responsibility.
q. The theory of necessity destroys distinction between truth and error.

b. Personalism alone adequately explains the nature of the categories.

3. The common anti-theistic arguments fail adequately to explain experience, for

a. Positivism fails in its account of the world order, for

x. It professes to know nothing of the nature or ultimate reality.
y. Its doctrine of phenomena involves metaphysical questions it seeks to avoid.
z. Its conception of law demands a science of Psychology whose practicability Comte would not allow.

b. Agnosticism, ending in a practical materialism, best represented by Herbert Spencer, is an inadequate explanation of the world order, for
w. It makes no attempt to solve epistemeological problems,
x. It does not maintain its doctrine of the unknowable,
y. It does not maintain its doctrine that the absolute must stand out of all relations.
z. Its formula of evolution is inadequate, for
l. It does not maintain its doctrine of the conservation of energy.
m. It does not maintain its doctrine of the instability of the homogeneous.
n. It gives no insight into the passage from the inorganic to the organic.
o. It lends no insight in the passage from life to mind.

c. Pantheism is an inadequate explanation of the universe, for
w. Objections against Materialism may in large part be urged against it.
x. All the objections against necessitarism may be urged against it.
y. All the need of personalism may be urged against it.

4. All the usual attributes of God follow from what has gone before.

5. The doctrine of God's omniscience, as we interpret it, can also be consistently maintained, for
a. We merely eliminate foreknowledge of contingent events.
b. Our suggestion merely limits the influence of contingent acts within fixed spheres.
c. It provides for God's foreknowledge of the future.
d. It has definite practical advantages.

B. The Christian doctrine of God has fixed practical advantages that emphasizes its truth, for
1. It emphasizes the value of moral living in attaining truth.
2. It offers the deepest incentive to the operation of our mental processes.
3. It offers the deepest incentive to high moral living.
4. It alone affords the assistance to life offered by religion.
5. It alone holds out the promises of a desirable future and helps to eradicate pessimism.

II. Application of our criterion to the Christian doctrine of Revelation brings certainty with regard to the truth of the latter, for
A. Human nature shows the need of a special and direct revelation, for
1. Reasoning from the natural world and human life is not sufficient, for
a. It is possible only to a few.

1. All like the confirmation that came from the evidence [illegible] by [illegible] events.
2. [illegible] by [illegible].

B. Difficulties with such revelation arise, not with [illegible] probability of the fact of revelation, but with what [illegible] to the method.

C. The method of Christian revelation is in accord with the intrinsic necessities of the case.

D. Submitted to the test of the usual historical canons, the Gospel records, especially, commend themselves to us as historically true, for

1. The Gospels were regarded as genuine and authentic by contemporaries, and did not materially alter during later generations.
2. The efforts of some critics to prove their genuineness and authenticity has failed, for
   a. The force of their case depends most largely on pantheistic and and naturalistic presuppositions.
   b. The myth-making theory of Strauss will not explain away the supernatural in the Gospels.
   c. The psychological explanations of Baur cannot account for the Fourth Gospel apart from Johanine authorship.
   d. Renan's theory of deliberate imposture is the reductio ad absurdum of the destructive criticism.
   e. Keim, in his estimate of the unique personality of Jesus, is compelled to begin a movement back to the orthodox position.

3. Internal evidence from the Gospels is indicative of the sincerity of the disciples and the authenticity of their records.

4. They reveal a unique personality, transcending the [illegible] of man, for
   a. A unique self-consciousness is revealed by Christ's claims on humanity in general, and his disciples in particular.
   b. A unique self-consciousness is revealed by His claims to pre-existence.
   c. A unique self-consciousness is revealed by His claims to omnipresence.
   d. The self-consciousness of Jesus witnesses to a [illegible] of power and authority utterly transcending the prophetic.
   e. Granting corresponding reality to his consciousness of personal pre-eminence we must place Him in the category of Deity.

E. The doctrine of the incarnation as a unique historical event is consistent both with revelation and reason.

F. Many practical advantages accrue to us from the use of the Holy Scriptures as a revelation from God, for

1. They can be appealed to as authoritative for the practical direction of man's life, for

a. They have [illegible] of all [illegible].
b. They are the outcome of the practical [illegible] of mankind.
c. The life of Jesus provides a practical guide for mankind, and, as involving the incarnation, makes for nearness to God.

G. Human experience is a hopeless enigma, if the Christian Scriptures and the person of Christ are not as the Church has represented them.

III. Application of our criterion to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity brings certainty with regard to the truth of the latter, for

A. We may presume the doctrine to be true on theoretical grounds, for
1. It is presupposed by Christian revelation.
2. It contains no contradictory elements.
3. It is in accord with rational explication of the nature of love.

B. We may presume the doctrine to be true on practical grounds, for

1. It conserves the unity of God and avoids tritheism.
2. It avoids the theoretical difficulties and practical dangers of pantheism.
3. It diversifies the thought of God for us, and gives some insight in which the human mind can rest.
4. It provides an appropriate background for the proper exercise of human fellowship.
5. It has a practical value as a rational system.

IV. Application of our criterion to the Christian doctrine of the nature of man in moral matters brings certainty with regard to the truth of the latter, for

A. The Christian doctrine of man's initial dignity is the only adequate theory of his fundamental nature, for

1. It is the only doctrine adequate theoretically, for

a. It is the Biblical theory.
b. It is the spontaneous expression of man's nature.
c. It avoids the difficulties of non-theistic and anti-theistic theories.
d. The theory of evolution, properly understood, does not militate against it.

2. Practically it is a needed doctrine, for

a. It calls men to live up to the highest standards.
b. It provides a concrete example in Jesus Christ.
c. Agnosticism or positivism offer no such advantages.
d. Materialism provides no proper conception of man's dignity.
e. Pantheism offers no rational incitement to man's self-development and culture.

B. The Christian doctrine of the fall is the adequate account of his present,

or second, nature, for

1. It provides an adequate theoretical account, for
   a. It is the expression of a [illegible].
   b. It is in accord with the teaching of the Christian revelation, whether its basis be interpreted as historical or parabolic.
   c. It can be regarded as true on either monogenist or polygenist theories.

2. Practically it alone stimulates to a sense of need of Divine aid, for
   a. The doctrine of sin as a survival of animal tendency stimulates to no such need.
   b. The doctrine that sin is due to environment stimulates to no such sense of need.
   c. The theory that sin can be eliminated by education does not press home this sense of need.

C. The doctrine of human freedom is the only adequate explanation of man's power of choice, for

1. It is the only adequate theoretic explanation, for
   a. It is in accord with the doctrine of man's dignity and also his Fall.
   b. It founds itself on the primary self-experience of man as a genuine personality.
   c. To it considerations of causality are secondary.
   d. It is necessary to explain adequately the sense of moral responsibility, the differences between truth and error, and the rapidity of some great moral transitions.
   e. It is in accord with the theory that an originative agent cannot be involved in a causal nexus.
   f. It is not contrary to the theory that presents choices help to fix future character.
   g. It is not contrary to the theory that environment influences human life.

2. It is the only proper practical stimulus to the sense of responsibility and to the energizing of the will.

D. The doctrine of personal immortality arises in accord with the demands of consistency, for

1. It is needed theoretically to explain fixed elements in our experience, for
   a. It is in accord with the other elements in the Christian doctrine of man's nature.
   b. It is in accord with Jesus' teaching concerning the nature of God, for
      x. It accords with the direct teaching of Jesus concerning the nature of God.
      y. It accords with the theistic implications of the desire for immortality.
   c. It is the consistent outcome of a demand for a prevailing justice and righteousness.
   d. It is in accord with intellectual demands for consistency.
   e. It is in accord with the demands of the religious nature.
   f. With the truth of the doctrine Jesus involves his moral integrity.

2. All practical evidences point to the truth of the doctrine, for

a. It aids in prayer giving power, for
   x. If the doctrine is not true, the striving after many of life's finest products is irrational.

D. The Christian doctrine of retribution is in accord with all available data, for
   1. It is in accord with available theoretical considerations, for
      a. The continuance of finite personal life is conditioned upon the will of God.
      b. The continuance of finite human life must be regarded as dependent also upon human obedience to Divinely fixed conditions,
      c. Irreparable retribution is not contrary to the conception of God as a God of love and mercy.
      d. Irreparable retribution is to be conceived of as one wilfully chosen by man.
      e, The doctrine makes place for the possibility of annihilation.

   2. The doctrine is of greatest practical value, for
      a. It has proved of greatest practical value in the past.
      b. It tells of retribution here as well as hereafter.
      c. It works now in the long run, if applied as it "set out to work."
      d. To lack of stress upon the doctrine may be attributed much of the irresponsiveness of great masses of our people to-day to the appeal of religion.
      e. The doctrine helps to a much needed self-restraint of the tendencies of our lower natures.

E. The Christian doctrine of heaven is consistent with all the data furnished by human experience, for

   1. Its appeal to a proper self-love is wholly rational.
   2. It represents the completion of love both to God and man.
   3. It is an outcome of a deep desire for a readjustment of environment with the highest ideals of life.
   4, It is the product of the moral demand for the elimination of unnecessary inequalities and gross injustices.

V. Application of our criterion to the interior processes of Christian consciousness reveals their harmony with both the Christian revelation and the deepest needs of human life, and so increases the Christian certainty, for

A. The first stage of Christian experience reveals the deepest conviction of sin and guilt, for

   1. While such conviction is universally manifest, it is stronger and deeper under Christian teaching.
   2. When presented as it ought to be the doctrine works as it set out to work."

B. In the progress of Christian experience, repentance itself involving faith, follows upon conviction.

C. The faith that has been implicit becomes explicit, and issues in an attitude of loyal self-committal to God as revealed by Jesus Christ.

D. The interior transformation, supervening on faith, goes to the very roots of man's being, for
   1. It often makes itself felt in the physical constitution and so involves the feelings.
   2. The change is marked in the clarification of the intellectual processes.
   3. The change is marked in the attitude of the will.

E. Added to these experiences there comes what St. Paul calls the witness of the Spirit with our spirits to sonship in God.

F. Finally, if the attitude of faith be persisted in, the processes of spiritual growth issue in sanctification that further purifies and enobles the whole being.

G. Changes as vital as those described must evidently bear their self-evidence and bring their own certainty, for

   1. They confirm the Christian's preliminary certainties concerning God.
   2. Semi-mystical experiences bring their satisfactions and urgencies to the individual soul.

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